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PREFACE 
 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year 
to outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects 
under a faculty member's supervision. Five research projects completed by the 
Glucksman Fellows of 2009-2010 are included in this special issue of the Finance 
Department Working Paper Series. These papers focus on important topics in empirical 
financial economics.   
Benedetta Arese Lucini, under the supervision of William Greene, analyzes the life cycle 
of movies by estimating revenues and costs beyond theatrical box office receipts and 
shows the benefits of portfolio diversification. Orit Vaknin, under the direction of Marti 
Subrahmanyam, examines whether the financial structure of family companies is more 
conservative than that of non-family companies.  Michael Reczek, under the supervision 
of David Yermack, examines four potential sources of future value that first-lien- 
covenant-lite debt provides to the borrower.  Denis Cranstoun, under the direction of 
Aswath Damodaran, analyzes the impact of access to equity financing on the valuation of 
publicly traded junior gold mining companies. Kiran Manda, under the direction of 
Menachem Brenner, examines stock market volatility before, during, and after the 2008 
Financial Crisis. These papers, reflecting the research effort of five outstanding Stern 
MBA students, are summarized in more detail in the Table of Contents on the next two 
pages. 
  
       William L. Silber, Director   
       Glucksman Institute     
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Benedetta Arese Lucini, “Analyzing the ROI of Independently Financed Films: 
Are there many more ‘Slumdogs’ than ‘Millionaires’?” 
The paper analyzes the life cycle of movies by estimating revenues and costs 
beyond theatrical box office receipts. The returns are computed comparing studio 
and independently financed films. The research shows that the median 
independent film loses money on a budget-weighted return. The analysis then 
focuses on the unique attributes of each film and argues that by applying portfolio 
theory, the expected return of a random selection of movies is positive about 60% 
of the time, driven primarily by the benefits of diversification.  
1
Orit Vaknin, “The Family Business Risk Profile” 
The goal of this study is to answer two questions about the unique characteristics 
of family firms: Is the financial structure of family companies more conservative 
than that of non-family companies? And, is the family company more financially 
healthy?  The results indicate that family firms’ financial structure is not 
materially different than that of non-family firms; nevertheless, they exhibit 
lower overall financial risk as captured by Z and Z’’-scores.  This conclusion is 
demonstrated by a low ratio of family firms that file for bankruptcy, relative to 
their representation in the economy.   
27
 
Michael Reczek, “An Examination of the Value of Covenant-Lite Debt to Issuing 
Companies” 
 
This paper examines four potential sources of future value that first-lien-
covenant-lite debt provides to the borrower: (1) the value of eliminating interest 
ratcheting and forbearance fees to waive maintenance covenant violations; (2) the 
opportunity for the borrower to repurchase covenant-lite debt at lower prices than 
if it had issued traditional first-lien debt; (3) the ability to delay bankruptcy and 
corresponding restructuring costs; and (4) the opportunity to extend the above 
advantages by means of debt reinstatement. 
49
 
Denis Cranstoun, “Effects of Equity Financing on Valuation of Junior Gold 
Mining Companies in Recessionary and Post-Recessionary Economic Realities of 
2008-2010” 
 
The study examines the impact of access to equity financing on the valuation of 
publicly- traded junior gold mining companies. This was done by measuring the 
average changes in the share price immediately following the transaction 
announcement. The study found no statistically significant relationship between 
65
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share price change and any of the factors which might be expected to influence 
stock prices, such as, dilution percentage, prior stock performance, warrant 
issuance, presence or absence of producing facilities, and underwriters’ domicile.    
 
Kiran Manda, “Stock Market Volatility during the 2008 Financial Crisis” 
This paper examines stock market volatility before, during, and after the 2008 
financial crisis. It explores whether different volatility markets behaved similarly 
during the crisis and also examines the importance of the leverage effect. The 
leverage effect refers to the relationship between stock returns and volatility: 
volatility increases when the stock prices fall. The results support the existence of 
the leverage effect.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE 
A few main players dominate the movie industry by controlling most of the revenues and 
market share, with as little as 6% of movies making up 80% of revenues. The major studios 
focus on releasing a few blockbuster movies with budgets over $60MM dollars and huge 
marketing spends, with the intention of attracting a wide audience. Most of these movies are 
produced in-house, but some are also acquired from smaller companies in different phases of the 
development process. The last decade has seen a new trend in the film industry, whereby new 
players have emerged under the assumption that making smaller budget movies with a limited 
release will necessitate significantly lower prints and advertising (P&A) expenses, and result in 
the potential for a significantly higher return on investment. The financial industry also accepted 
this assumption, and began increasingly investing in these so-called “indies”, while the major 
studios concurrently created specialty arms to play in this space. A small number of hits kept the 
industry expanding every year, but with the major collapse of financial markets, the money 
invested in film decreased dramatically over the past 2 years. Many specialty houses, both 
independent and studio owned, closed as the numbers did not add up, and many investors were 
burned by the significant losses incurred. 
 
II. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze in depth the financing of films released in the last 
decade (Jan 2000 – Oct 2009). The movies will be categorized into two major groups, those that 
have been financed independently and those that have been financed by a studio. The budgets of 
these movies will then be compared to the revenue streams from distribution windows and 
ancillary rights on a cash-on-cash basis to evaluate the return for the initial financier. With the 
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collected data that should represent the full sample significantly, this paper will use statistical 
analysis to predict US DVD revenues from domestic box office and other variables. The results 
will be used to produce a model to predict the ultimate cash flow over the life of a movie both in 
the domestic and international markets. The return on cash invested for the financier will then be 
calculated by taking into account all the costs incurred in the production and distribution of the 
movie and the average retention rates of each cash flow stream. This paper will hopefully prove 
that on average, the returns for financers are significantly lower than that of an average market 
portfolio and will look at the reasons why movies have not historically performed as expected. 
 
III. PRIOR RESEARCH IN THE FIELD 
  There have not been a lot of studies that look at film revenues beyond the box office 
numbers. Much of the research in this field is specifically focused on the impact of intrinsic 
factors to each film in driving its success at the box office. The main reason why box office is the 
only data point that is referenced to, when identifying a film’s success is that this number drives 
most of the other revenues and cost streams for movies. What this means is that both DVD sales 
and the ultimate revenues for movies are dependent numbers on box office results, given that it is 
the best indicator of demand. Furthermore, the cost of movies, participations to talent, and TV 
output deals are all calculated as a percentage of box office results. Even a portion of the 
marketing budget is dependent on box office because if a movie is performing, the advertising 
spend will increase to help the movie grow in revenues. This is particularly the case with small 
independent films that open on a limited release. 
There has been a lot of research in the field of predictability given the risky nature of the 
movie business as many movies ultimately lose money. De Vany, A in his book Hollywood 
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Economics: How Extreme Uncertainty Shapes the Film Industry focuses on the topic of 
distribution of profits and how these are shown to follow a stable non–Gaussian distribution with 
heavy tails and infinite variance. In his 2005 paper De Vany also finds that stars are not 
significant in producing profits and thus mitigating risks, and that bigger budgets do not lead to 
higher profits.  Joshi, A and Hanssens, D among others, stated that even though big budgets are 
not the drivers of revenue, advertising can help increase movie returns. They also analyze how 
this spending will also signal to the market about public companies’ valuation of the movies they 
are releasing.  
 
IV. THE REVENUE WATERFALL FOR INDEPENDENT FILM 
IV.I The Distributor Film Rentals from Box Office 
There are multiple ways in which films can be financed both by studios and 
independently. Fee, E outlines these very precisely in his paper The Cost of Outside Equity 
Control and the table below summarizes his definitions: 
Table 1: Financing Categorization 
Classification Type of Financing Description 
Studio Studio development deal Early involvement, at script stage 
Studio Studio based independent 
production 
Exclusive relationship between the studio and an 
independent producers 
Studio Studio Financing/ 
distribution deal 
Financing of a already packaged movie 
Studio Negative Pick-up Studio will finance the cost of the movie only 
when it is completed (guarantee) 
Independent Co-financing Financed by multiple players 
Independent Foreign presles Sell theatrical and video rights to distributors 
internationally based on script 
Independent Long-term financing Financing for a slate of movies 
Independent Single film financing Limited partnership on one project 
Independent Self-Financing Producer finances movie himself 
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Studios can also get involved at a later stage by agreeing to distribute the independent 
film; they will generally buy the movie at a festival and market it with their own slate of films.  
An independent house can also decide to rent a distributor for a fee but maintain more of the 
upside from the revenue streams. Fee, E. looks at the decisions of a producer of an independent 
film by weighing how different financing agreements constitute a trade-off between retaining 
controls over the films property and creative vision or relying on outside equity and loosing the 
power. He concludes that by allowing for an involvement by an outside investor the film will 
incur costs that are mainly creative but will also have benefits, especially in distribution. The 
decision will mostly be influenced by how high the artistic stake is in a movie, and this is a 
reason to justify the continuous growth in independent films. 
Given the decision made by filmmakers to be financed independently, it is interesting to 
investigate the actual profits that this asset generates for its investors. In order to better 
understand what the actual returns for financiers are it is necessary to outline how the revenues 
generated by movies, in each of the distribution windows, will be split between all significant 
players. Also, a better understanding of the real costs of a movie, above the actual budget, or 
“negative cost”, and their accounting, will clarify why the investor gets paid back at a 
significantly later stage of the cash flow stream. 
Firstly, when a movie is released theatrically, for every dollar of US domestic box office, 
the exhibitor, who owns the movie theatres, retains about 55% and thus only 45% of total box 
office revenues comes back to the film producers.  Given that foreign distributors keep most of 
international revenue and the foreign sales agencies receive a percentage for selling the 
international rights as pre-sales (in the production phase of the movie), only 30% of international 
box office will be retained by the production company. The Distributor Film Rental  (DFR) is 
thus calculated as DFR = 0 .45 * BO US + 0 .30 * BO Int .There is an additional distribution fee that 
will be subtracted from the DFR to cover studio overhead (about 10% of DFR) and charges an 
additional fee (about 15% of DFR) to independent companies. The remaining cash flow is 
considered the net revenues for the movie. 
Before the financier is able to recoup any money the distributor will recoup its P&A 
expenses. This includes all the money spent to market the movie and to physically produce 
copies for the theatres. On average this will be a calculated as a minimum of $2MM for movies 
with budgets below $10MM, and will be driven by worldwide box office success. If the box 
office gross for a movie is less than the “negative cost” then marketing will be limited to 10% of 
box office. For successful films it will rise up to on average 15% of worldwide box office for 
independents and 20% for studio movies. Another major cash outflow for the movie are 
exploitation costs, which include residuals and talent participations, usually accounting for, on 
average, 10% of worldwide gross. After all expenses have been recouped, the financier will start 
to receive his initial investment back, if the movie generated any positive cash flows. After that 
the financier will participate in a split with the production company and the talent in any upside.  
Diagram 1: Revenue waterfall for theatrical 
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IV.II What Happens Next? 
After a movie has been exhibited in theatres it will be cleverly sold through different 
channels in a system called windowing. This means that for the next 10 years it will receive 
revenue streams from other forms of distribution deals. This sophisticated model is what has 
allowed studio movies to be successful on average and for companies to be valued on their 
movie library. A typical movie window timeline is shown below: 
Diagram 2: The movie windows 
Free TV 
(Broadcast)
+27 ms 
Pay TV 
(Cable)
+12 ms
Pay per 
View
+6 to +8 ms
Home Video 
(DVD)
+3 to +6 ms
Airlines 
+3 to +4 ms 
Theatrical 
Revenues 
0 to +3 ms 
 
In order to compute the total return for an investor it is important to predict these cash 
flow streams that together make what is called the “ultimate” for a film. The main revenue 
source after box office is the Home Video market that with the release of DVDs has seen a major 
growth in the last 10 years, both nationally and internationally. It is important to note that this is 
slowly changing given the increasingly common new options available to consumers such as 
video downloading and streaming. The costs incurred for the film have been modeled as 
manufacturing costs of 7% of sales and marketing costs of about 5% of net revenues, floored at a 
minimum spend of $2MM.  
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Other than DVD sales other sources of revenue for the film are TV output deals with 
cable channels, pay per view options, free TV and airlines. In the chapter Profits out of the 
Picture: Research Issues and Revenue Sources beyond North America Box Office Weinberg, C 
argues that “industry trade publications estimate that the (TV) networks pay approximately 15% 
of domestic box office for the first three to four showings of feature films. Pay per view and 
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video on demand were smaller deals at the time the chapter was written but have gained 
significant sales revenues for the industry in the past few years and have substituted those of free 
TV. Therefore this assumption will be maintained when calculating ultimate ancillary revenues 
for films but will be capped at a $15 million rate for all movies. Studio movies will then have the 
extra revenue from merchandising and licensing, which are beyond the scope of this analysis, as 
it is hard to generalize across different film properties.  
IV.III Definition of Return on Investment 
Return on Investment will be defined as the cash remaining after all expenses have been 
deducted from the “ultimate” (DFR and other movie revenue streams) over the negative cost of 
the movie. This does not take into account the time value of money given that the cash flows of 
the movie will be obtained starting at about a minimum of 2 years after the initial investment. It 
is a necessary assumption to evaluate multiple movies on a consistent basis. It is important to 
note that the accounting treatment allows film companies to amortize the negative costs of the 
movie over its life cycle. This will allow film companies to reduce the initial large losses that 
they incur when investing to make a movie.  
 
V. THE DATA 
V. Sample Selection 
For the period analyzed, release dates from January 2000 to October 2009, there were 
5,276 movies released in the US of which 38% were also distributed internationally. 
Furthermore, from the American Film Market (AFM) film catalogue, it is evident that another 
2,858 movies were trying to get sold for release during this period and more than 90% of them 
never did, ending up in straight-to-DVD distribution. The latter are all categorized as 
independently financed.  
The database for ROI analysis has been carefully constructed to include all movie titles 
from the sample, which have available budget information. Each title was then categorized as 
independent or studio financed by distinguishing whether the main producer was an independent 
company or a studio/ studio subsidiary, even if a studio ultimately distributed the movie. All the 
movies with budgets under $2MM were also categorized as independently financed. Theatrical 
box office, domestically and worldwide and other information such as genre, rating and Oscar 
nomination, were also collected to classify the title.  
The set of movies that will be analyzed compromises 1,815 films, 900 of which were 
categorized as independently financed and 825 as studio financed. The range of budgets for the 
movies in the database ranges from $258MM to less than $10,000. The database is populated 
with movies with multiple ratings and genres, all of which have had domestic distribution. Some 
of the statistics on the database are summarized below: 
• Ratings: The database reflects the general knowledge that independently financed 
movies are mostly rated R and that studio movies will try to appeal to a wider audience 
and thus be significant in the G to PG-13 ratings. There are more that 10% of indie 
movies that have not been rated and this implies that they have never had a large release.  
Chart 1: Distribution of films by Rating 
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• Genre: Of the 12 genres by which movies have been categorized, again it is clear that 
independently financed films focus mainly on dramas and secondly on comedy. This is 
probably correlated to the fact that these are cheaper films to shoot, since indies are 
usually constrained by smaller budgets. The distribution for studio films is similar even 
though the Action and Adventure categories play a much larger role in the studio 
portfolio.  
Chart 2: Distribution of films by Genre 
 
• Budget: It is industry standard to accept indies as the lowest budget films. By the data 
collected it is clear that this is the case most of the time. But as studios have moved into 
the lower budget, auteur films, the dividing line becomes fuzzier. As the data suggests, 
studios like to play big, while indies will typically stay below  a $25MM budget range. 
Chart 3: Distribution of films by Budget 
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• Oscar Nomination: Without including the 2010 Oscars, the data analyzed shows that 
Studios win the Oscar competition most of the time, with 62% of Oscar nominated 
movies. This is changing rapidly as the academy recognizes the audiences’ appreciation 
for more auteur movies.  
V.II Predicting domestic DVD sales 
Theatrical box office is easily accessible information, but when it comes to DVD sales it 
is a much harder number to identify. The website the-numbers.com has information on domestic 
DVD sales for a selected number of titles over the Jan 2006 - Oct 2009 period. The paper will 
make use of this data and statistical analysis to determine a statistically significant regression 
equation that can predict DVD sales based on a number of predictive variables, including 
domestic box office, budget, rating, genre and Oscar nomination.  This will in turn be used to 
determine the DVD sales for the full dataset of movies. 
Two separate regressions were performed on studio movies and on independent movies  
data, because studio backed films on average can achieve much higher DVD sales than 
independents and are affected differently by the predictor variables.  The results of my statistical 
analysis are summarized below. 
• Studio Movies - The regression equation is: 
log Sales Revenue = 4.61 + 0.613 log Domestic BO + 0.128 log Budget + 0.103 G - 0.309 PG - 0.561 PG-13 - 
0.362 R - 0.189 Drama - 0.213 Thriller/Suspense - 0.158 Comedy - 0.157 Action + 0.627 Musical - 0.040 Adventure 
- 0.565 Black Comedy - 0.416 Horror - 0.005 Romantic Comedy + 0.104 Oscar Nomination 
Natural logarithms were used because of the large numbers in both the predictors and the 
dependent variable so that the relationship would be better explained and R2 will be higher. The 
details of this regression are as follows: 
 
Predictor             Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant             4.612    1.107   4.17  0.000 
log Domestic BO    0.61346  0.03986  15.39  0.000 
log Budget         0.12768  0.05961   2.14  0.033 
G                   0.1032   0.7152   0.14  0.885 
PG                 -0.3092   0.6873  -0.45  0.653 
PG-13              -0.5606   0.6846  -0.82  0.413 
R                  -0.3624   0.6821  -0.53  0.596 
Drama              -0.1888   0.3476  -0.54  0.588 
Thriller/Suspense  -0.2127   0.3569  -0.60  0.552 
Comedy             -0.1583   0.3526  -0.45  0.654 
Action             -0.1570   0.3560  -0.44  0.659 
Musical             0.6269   0.4319   1.45  0.148 
Adventure          -0.0403   0.3596  -0.11  0.911 
Black Comedy       -0.5652   0.6754  -0.84  0.403 
Horror             -0.4164   0.3755  -1.11  0.268 
Romantic Comedy    -0.0047   0.3721  -0.01  0.990 
Oscar Nomination   0.10407  0.09146   1.14  0.256 
S = 0.583986   R-Sq = 68.2%   R-Sq(adj) = 66.4% 
It is interesting to note that the dependent variable can mainly be explained by the 
domestic box office. This result proves why most of academic and industry research has 
concentrated on these numbers as the main performance indicators. By using a scatter-plot of the 
two variables against each other and fitting the regression line, the relationship can be clearly 
visualized.  
Chart 4: Regression of US DVD Sales to Domestic Box Office 
 
For studio movies, the budget plays another important role. This could be because the 
studio invests this negative cost and thus is more motivated to recoup it through post-theatrical 
sales. They will invest more in marketing and retail shelf space deals in order to get the DVDs of 
their largest budget movies sold. 
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• Indie Movies - The regression equation is: 
log Sales Revenue = 9.63 + 0.442 log Domestic BO - 0.0743 log Budget + 1.08 G + 0.678 PG + 0.605 PG-13 + 
0.553 R - 0.028 Drama - 0.015 Thriller/Suspense + 0.004 Comedy + 0.211 Action + 0.185 Musical + 0.001 
Adventure - 0.370 Black Comedy - 0.326 Documentary + 0.320 Horror - 0.355 Oscar Nomination 
Natural logarithms were used in this equation for the same reasons outlined above. The 
R2 for this equation is lower because of the nature of independent movies, given the hit or miss 
business model, which is even less predictable than that of studio movies. Furthermore 
independents have less money to spend on DVD release and will therefore rely more on 
consumer viral marketing. The details of the regression are below: 
Predictor              Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant             9.6323   0.9551  10.09  0.000 
log Domestic BO     0.44196  0.03425  12.90  0.000 
log Budget         -0.07432  0.05044  -1.47  0.142 
G                    1.0833   0.5980   1.81  0.071 
PG                   0.6784   0.5501   1.23  0.219 
PG-13                0.6053   0.5320   1.14  0.257 
R                    0.5527   0.5377   1.03  0.305 
Drama               -0.0276   0.2499  -0.11  0.912 
Thriller/Suspense   -0.0150   0.2656  -0.06  0.955 
Comedy               0.0038   0.2487   0.02  0.988 
Action               0.2106   0.2645   0.80  0.427 
Musical              0.1849   0.4150   0.45  0.656 
Adventure            0.0013   0.3153   0.00  0.997 
Black Comedy        -0.3698   0.4607  -0.80  0.423 
Documentary         -0.3257   0.4162  -0.78  0.435 
Horror               0.3203   0.2676   1.20  0.233 
Oscar Nomination    -0.3548   0.1520  -2.33  0.021 
S = 0.677110   R-Sq = 50.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 46.7% 
Again domestic box office is the main predictor of DVD sales and is statistically 
significant. It is interesting to note the negative sign on the budget coefficient. This could be 
driven by higher budget movies competing with the studio ones on DVD customers but with a 
smaller marketing spend and no infrastructure. Also, the nature of independents is to be low 
budget films so there should be a smaller correlation between the negative cost and the movie’s 
success. Another observation from the data is that dramas and documentaries are the genres that 
negatively affect DVD sales, but these are the protagonist-driven genres of many significant 
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independent film festivals such as Sundance. Furthermore, Oscar nomination also seems to have 
a negative coefficient. This could be explained by the fact that independent movies do not time 
their release around the Academy Awards as much as studio ones and might already be out of 
theatres and have released their DVD, thus having potentially no added income from the press 
around the Oscars.   
Once the two regressions were used to estimate domestic DVD sales revenues, they were 
used as an indicator of potential international sales. The demand for the title internationally was 
calculated as a ratio of foreign box office versus that in the US. This was then multiplied by the 
US estimate to get an international revenue stream. The main assumption here is that all foreign 
markets behave like the US in terms of DVD consumption, which is not necessarily true, but for 
the purpose of the analysis it is assumed that on average it should converge.  
V.III The Ultimate Multiple 
Once the DVD and other ancillary revenues were calculated and added to the DFR for each 
movie, these were used to compute the ultimate multiple. This can be used as a good predictor to 
calculate the total revenues of a film once the distributor film rentals (DFR) are known. This is a 
way for studios to predict the life value of each of their films after they have observed the box 
office performance. The two variables were regressed against each other and the regression 
multiple is 2.33x. This means that the other revenues count for 133% of the theatrical. This is 
important to note as it shows that when looking at movie profitability the other revenue streams 
should be taken into closer consideration. Below is the regression showing this relationship, with 
an R2 of over 90%. Not that as the DFR gets larger the outliers increase in both directions.  The 
highest ultimate multiple movies are the G rated animated films for children, such as the Pixar 
and Disney ones that have a very long revenue life after their initial theatrical release. 
Merchandising and licensing also play a large part and are not included in the calculation, thus 
making the multiple even larger than currently computed. 
Chart 5: Regression of Ultimate Revenues to Distributor Film Rentals 
 
 
VI. THE ANALYSIS 
VI. Let’s analyze returns 
The cash-on-cash return on investment was calculated for the 990 independently financed 
movies analyzed. All the revenues of the film, as described above, were added together and all 
the costs associated to making those revenues subtracted from these. This final cash flow was 
compared to the initial “negative”, the movie budget. If the cash flows were smaller than the 
initial budget then the financiers achieved a negative return on their investment. If the return was 
less than -100% this implies that the financiers never received anything back from the film and 
that even the production company and distributors were exposed to a loss. If the ROI on the 
movie is more than 100% then this means that the financier was able to double its initial 
investment in the film. The distribution of independently financed returns is shown below: 
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Chart 6: Distribution of independent Film Returns 
 
As already documented by De Vany, A. the returns of films do not follow a normal 
distribution. The anomaly of movie returns explained by the large tails, shows that  
independently financed films behave like extreme events. This makes the predictability of a 
success nearly impossible, given the infinite variance of returns.  
The distribution of returns can be analyzed in more detail by disregarding the tails. This 
assumes that over a large enough number of films the two tails will cancel out.  
Chart 6: Distribution of independent Film Returns 
 
The kurtosis of the distribution is low, given the flat peak around the mean and a more 
uniform distribution. It is interesting to note that increasing returns diminish quicker than 
decreasing ones.  The investors of independently financed films will have a positive return 45% 
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of the time but will double its money (ROI > 100%) only 25% of the time. Given that the cash 
flows of a film are generally achieved over a period of at least 10 years after the initial 
investment, this equates to a yearly return of 7.18%.   
When looking at the entire distribution the mean is large and positive. This is because 
there is a positive skew in the distribution, the tail on the right is larger, as negative returns are 
floored by how much money is invested, both the negative and the film costs. This is not a 
significant number in explaining the potential return from a film. The median is a better indicator 
as it reduces the importance of outliers. The median ROI is -13.12% for an independently 
financed movie. This is a clear signal of the historic underperformance of these types of films. In 
contrast, the median of the studio-financed movies is 27%.  On an annual basis over a ten-year 
period, this is not an impressive result either but it has sustained the studio model through the 
years.  
The absolute return of a film, as calculated for the purposes of the analysis is heavily 
influenced by the size of the denominator. Very small budget movies will have significantly 
larger returns, both in positive and negative terms. To eliminate this effect, the analysis looks at 
both the absolute returns of movies in the sample and the budget-weighted % return over the 
whole portfolio. The statistics for studio and independently finance films are summarized below: 
Table 2: The cash-on-cash Returns 
Variable Studio Financed Independently Financed 
Returns in % 
Average % Return 153% 1055% 
Median % Return 27% (13%) 
Budget-Weighted Returns 
Average of Absolute Returns $26,921,922  $2,213,197  
Median of Absolute Returns $8,846,379  ($1,389,147) 
Total of Budgets $45,732,091,638  $19,639,637,318  
Total of Absolute Returns $22,210,585,390  $2,191,065,514  
% Budget-weighted Return 48.57% 11.16% 
Yearly return (over 10 years) 4.04% 1.06% 
It is pretty clear from the data that studio movies outperform the independent ones when 
looking at budget-weighted returns. For every $1 invested in a studio film, the return is $1.49 
dollars, whilst for an independent it is only $1.11. Over a 10-year horizon for the investment this 
equates to 1.06% return a year. This shows that leaving the “negative” money in a bank account 
or in marketable securities is a better investment than independent movies, on the full portfolio. 
Independents though, do benefit from the lower costs involved in making the movie and 
marketing it, thus driving returns significantly higher for the successes than that of movie studios 
where the initial investment, that has to be recovered, is larger.  
It is important to note that when using the median, and thus eliminating the effect of 
outliers, the return for an independent is actually negative. This is no surprise, given the failure 
of many of the independent film companies in the last few years. The asset class has proven to be 
a difficult investment to make even if in theory the lower sunk costs would facilitate the speed at 
which the movie would be profitable for every dollar of profit achieved.  
VI.II A little bit on portfolio theory 
The paper is now going to look at all the independent movies in the sample and is going 
to apply portfolio theory to discuss the returns for specific portfolios of movies. Assume that 
there is an investor who has no insider knowledge on any of the movies that he can choose to 
invest in. It will also be understood that by randomly selecting a small portfolio of 8-10 films, 
the investor is fully diversified, as there is no covariance between films, if they are not sequels. 
The covariance measures how returns of assets move together; thus no covariance describes the 
unpredictability of any title, whose performance cannot be predicted by that of any other film. 
The 100 portfolios were selected randomly and then the return of each portfolio was calculated 
as follows: . The return from the asset was already calculated and the E (Rp ) = wiE (Ri)
i
∑
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weights for each film were found as the budget over the total portfolio investment. This assumes 
that when an investor selects a movie, he will fully invest in it. Table 1 in the Appendix shows 
the details for weighted returns for a selection of 100 portfolios with randomly assigned movies. 
The returns are also shown in the chart below.  
Chart 7: Expected Returns from each Portfolio 
 
In this particular randomization, the number of portfolios with positive returns outweighs 
that with negative, both in number and size. There are 44 portfolios with negative returns and 38 
portfolios yielding more than 20% return. Therefore by allowing diversification there is a larger 
probability of actually achieving a positive return, rather than on single investments, because of 
successes covering for the effects of losses.  
When repeating the random selection of portfolios for 150 iterations, it is interesting to 
note that the number of negative portfolios will rarely be 50% and never above, as shown below: 
Chart 8: Distribution of Expected Failing Portfolios 
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It can be argued that investors will have some information on the movies they want to 
invest in and will then decide to invest in those they believe will be more profitable. The analysis 
looks at portfolios of films based on certain characteristics to compare their performance. The 
data for expected portfolio returns is shown below: 
Table 3: The Returns from Portfolios by type 
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The findings show that the best type of portfolio to invest in is of G rated films because 
as mentioned before, they have a high multiple for non-theatrical returns. NR movies are the 
worst performers, probably because of limited release and low investment in promoting ancillary 
revenues. These films might have to use a rent-a-distributor system and only release to get critics 
reviews for the movie. Surprisingly documentaries are very high performers. This could be 
explained by the fact that the negative cost is usually very low and that the sample is skewed to 
include only the ones that get theatrical release. For documentaries this is usually a very limited 
number as most will only be bought for TV release. horror and romantic comedies are other safer 
genres to look into when selecting a film investment. It is also absolutely clear that higher budget 
movies will not translate in better returns in the independents category, contrary to the strategy of 
studios. This could be because the production can devote a much lower marketing spend towards 
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the film and thus making it harder to support its post-theatrical success. Many studio independent 
film arms and production companies, given the easy capital markets from 2004 to 2008, 
dangerously moved into higher budget territory when looking at what films to produce and 
causing them to go out of business.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION: WHY DO INVESTMENTS IN FILM PERFORM POORLY? 
This paper’s results have further analyzed in depth movie returns by considering their life 
after the theatrical release. Even if in general the returns should be higher than those addressed 
by research on box office proceeds, they show that investing in movies is still a very risky 
decision. The reason why the returns are so variable is because learning from the past is an 
impossible task to do. Each new film is unique and comparing it to past releases will not predict 
its returns with any degree of certainty.  
 The investment could be compared to that of venture capital (VC) companies looking to 
give money to start-ups. Each film could be analyzed as a new venture that has no reliable 
information and a relatively low track record of performance, given only by the prior experience 
of the creative talent involved. The way a VC firm looks to limit the risk is to finance the new 
venture in stages and will only release more funds if the venture achieves some pre-defined set of 
milestones. This technique cannot be used with films because they are very capital intensive to 
make and the full cost is sunk before demand can be assessed. All film contracts with talent are 
also conditional on achievement of full financing and thus staging will not be possible during 
production.  
An extra challenge faced by independent production companies is the uncertainty of 
distribution. When looking at the performance of the analyzed films, it is clear that the returns 
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can be, for successful films, quite rewarding. The main problem here is that the data only takes 
into account the distributed movies, thus having a positive bias on the returns. The information 
from the American Film Market shows that there were at least 2,570 completed and never 
distributed English language films in the same period. This means that investors in these films 
earned -100% returns driving the expected return for a film to a significantly lower % than that 
calculated at 11.16%. On top of these completed movies thousands of scripts are written every 
year for financing consideration that never get made. The rigorous process that production 
companies set up, through screening and then development of the best ideas, helps investors 
select from a smaller pool of projects and thus lower the risk of bad investments.  
Another observation worth mentioning is on the nature of the consumption of the product. 
Movies are experience goods, meaning that the customer has to buy them before they can try 
them. The trailers provide some amount of information about the film itself, but none about the 
experience. This phenomenon makes demand for a movie very uncertain; it will be price elastic 
and shifting through time.  
A better understanding of the variance in the returns is through an attribute of the asset, its 
uniqueness. This can be used to investors’ advantage in formulating better financing strategies. 
Instead of looking at each movie separately, a structure should be put in place for investors to 
select to participate in a portfolio of films, thus valuing films on an aggregation basis. As shown 
by the data above, when all films are looked at separately, the median budget-weighted return 
was negative. On the other hand, looking at the portfolio analysis using random selection shows 
that pooling the assets will get the successes to compensate for the losses, thus giving portfolio 
successes a probability of on average about 60. This is because the covariance of the films in the 
portfolio is close to 0, thus eliminating all idiosyncratic risk through diversification. 
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No matter how bad the returns look, financing of films will continue and the industry will 
never disappear because movies can be considered a “status investment” and the benefits 
associated to being part of this industry as an employee or a financier are larger than the actual 
value of financial returns. Just by walking by a newspaper stand it is clear that this industry is 
vastly talked about and that fame is aspired by many. This is why investors of independent films 
will continue to “Get Rich or Die Tryin’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table 1: Portfolio Returns for one random selection 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The family owned business is the backbone of the world economy. By some estimates, 
over 90% of all business enterprises in the United States are family-owned and 60% of all 
employees are in family owned businesses (Ibrahim and Elis, 1994; Colli, 2003).  In the UK, 
approximately 76% of the largest 8,000 companies are either family owned or controlled (Gallo, 
1994). Among the largest corporations in the US, approximately 30-40% are estimated to be 
family owned (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Duru and Reeb, 2009) Researchers have 
found similar statistics for family firms around the world (Dreux, 1990; Martinez, 1994; Owens, 
1994).  Therefore, a better grasp of the unique characteristics of family firms is a basis for 
understanding a significant part of the world’s economy.    
Several papers have been written about the unique characteristics of family businesses 
and their performance compared to that of non-family businesses.  Most research done in the 
field focused on corporate governance measures, family relationships, succession, and 
performance indicators of family owned businesses.  Generally speaking, there are two schools 
of thought with regard to the analysis of family business performance.  The first claims that due 
to the family-centered nature of the family firm, it tends to be led by nepotism, irrational decision 
making processes, and conflicts of interests between those of the family and those of 
shareholders.  The second school of thought takes the opposite view: Due to the family’s 
commitment to the business, the firm is managed with a much longer time horizon than non-
family companies, employees are generally more loyal to the firm, and family members manage 
the firm with prudence and care, since it is inexorably linked to the family’s heritage and pride.  
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Research papers focused on family business performance reveal mixed results. Again, 
some indicate that family firms outperform non-family peers, while other papers show the 
opposite. An analysis conducted by Thomson Financial, for example, showed evidence for the 
outperformance of family companies in six European countries. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) find that family firms have higher Tobin’s q than non-family firms.  Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) found that family ownership creates value in first generation family firms (i.e. the founder 
serves as CEO or chairman). On the other hand, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that in 
large US corporations, family firms have lower Tobin’s q, indicating that, due to impaired 
governance and incentives mechanisms, family firms are managed less effectively and 
underperform their competitors.  
In this research I will focus on evaluating the financial and capital structure choices made 
by family businesses in an attempt to characterize the risk profile of the family business.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) found that large and 
undiversified shareholders, such as those found in family firms, may induce the company’s risk 
aversion by avoiding high risk projects even when they are positive NPV, consequently imposing 
costs on other, well-diversified shareholders.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicate otherwise – 
the structure of the family business reduces the principal-agent issues and the asymmetric 
information between shareholders and managers, therefore suggesting that monitoring erodes the 
risk aversion nature of the controlling families. 
The hypothesis leading this paper is that factors that are unique to family owned firms – 
such as longer-term time horizon, family legacy and succession considerations – could  
potentially impact capital structure choices and make family businesses more risk averse and 
conservative from a financial stand point.  This would suggest that family owned companies 
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have lower leverage and lower risk, which could be a disadvantage if it creates a sub-optimal 
capital structure. At the same time, however, this may result in a lower inherent risk which could 
actually benefit companies, especially in times of economic downturn. 
The paper is divided in two parts. It is structured as follows: the first part will focus on 
the characteristics of the family firm in terms of capital structure and leverage, and evaluate 
whether there are any significant differences between the leverage and risk choices of family and 
non-family firms.  The second part will examine a series of bankruptcy filings in the US during 
the years 2004, 2006, and 2008, and evaluate the proportion of family businesses in this sample.  
 
II. PART I – CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND RISK PROFILE 
II.1 Methodology 
This section will examine the characteristics of the family firm in terms of capital 
structure and leverage.  I use a database created by David M. Reeb and Ronald C. Anderson for 
their research on family businesses.  The dataset is comprised of 403 S&P 500 firms in the years 
1992-1999, excluding banks and public utilities firms.  For each firm they identify founding 
family presence, using manually collected data from corporate proxy statements on board 
structure and characteristics, CEO attributes, equity ownership structure, and founding-family 
attributes.  
I focus on the most recent year in Reeb and Anderson’s database (1999), which includes 
282 of the firms that were part of the initial sample in 1992.  I identify the firms that are still 
publicly traded under the same ticker symbol in 2010.  This screen results in a sample of 193 
public firms, out of which 52 (27%) are family businesses.  A variety of accounting and financial 
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variables are then drawn from Capital IQ, including: size (number of employees, market 
capitalization, total revenues, enterprise value), industry, age of firm, profitability metrics (ROE, 
ROA, EBITDA margin, net income margin), leverage measures (debt to capital ratio, debt to 
EBITDA ratio, interest coverage ratio), and the different variables needed to calculate Altman’s 
Z-score and Z’’-score.   I evaluate the capital structure using multi-variable regression analysis, 
controlling for characteristics such as company’s industry, size, and age.  In all the regressions, 
the intercept coefficient is set to equal zero to account for the notion that when all characteristics 
of a firm are zero, the leverage and risk metrics are meaningless. 
II.2 Descriptive Statistics 
To estimate the significance of the difference between family and non-family firms on 
each of the independent variables used in this study, I used a simple T-test. The outcomes of the 
different T-test are summarized in Table 1, which indicates that most the controlling variables 
used in the paper are essentially the same for both types of companies.  The exception is 
profitability measures, in which non-family firms appear to be more profitable than their peers.  
As for the dependent variables, from a simple T-test presented in Table 2, it seems that 
they are the same for both family and non-family firms.  However, a closer examination of the 
relationship between the variables in the form of a regression is required to estimate this 
relationship, while controlling for other possible explanations for the outcome we see using the 
T-test. 
II.3 Regression Analysis 
I use a regression analysis to evaluate whether a family owned company has a different 
level of leverage than a similar non-family company.  As an indicator of leverage, I use two 
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variables: Debt/ EBITDA ratio and Interest Coverage Ratio.  I did not examine the more obvious 
ratio of Debt/Capital because it is influenced not only by the choice of debt level the company 
makes, but also by the level of equity the company has. This would have introduced market 
perception of the firm into the equation, and would not be a “clean” estimate of the leverage 
choices made by the firm.  I then analyze the family company risk characteristics by evaluating 
not only the debt structure, but also the risk exposure the company is willing to take on, 
hypothesizing that a family firm would have a tendency to be more risk averse, all other things 
being equal.  
II.3.1 Leverage 
The summary of regression outcomes for the leverage variables is displayed in Table 3 
and Table 4. Five regressions were run for each of the two dependent variables (Debt/EBITDA 
and Interest Coverage Ratio).  Each of the five regressions is a derivative of the following 
extended regression equation: 
Debt/ EBITDA = β1*Family Dummy + β2*Age + β3*Size measure + β4*Industry Dummy +   
β5*Profitability measure + β6*Interaction Variables 
The first regression of the Debt/ EBITDA analysis is a simple regression of family 
dummy variable against the leverage measure, controlling for other possible impactful variables, 
including age of firm, industry, number of employees, revenues, market capitalizations, and 
profitability metrics. This regression shows no significance at the debt level. Regression 2 adds 
interaction of two of the controlling variables with the family dummy, in order to examine the 
cross-influence of an “older” family business on debt and a larger family firm on debt.  Neither 
of these variables are significant.   
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The three last regressions (regressions 4, 5, 6) exclude some of the controlling variables 
and include some combination of interaction variables between size and family, profitability and 
family, and age and family.  These regression outcomes indicate that family firms actually have a 
higher level of debt, all else equal. This is surprising, considering the characteristics of a family 
controlled business indicated in several research papers. As discussed earlier, it is believed that 
the family ownership and control would result in a more risk averse structure and a tendency to 
avoid high risk activities.  This study shows that the level of debt a family company takes on is, 
if anything, higher than that of a non-family firm.  However, the statistical significance of the 
family dummy coefficient in most regressions is limited. The results of the regressions using 
different combination of variables are mixed, but they certainly do not indicate a lower debt ratio 
for family firms.  
The same is true for the interest coverage ratio regressions.  Although the regressions as a 
whole are sufficiently robust, the family dummy is not significant in the vast majority of the 
regressions.  The interaction variables are mostly highly insignificant, suggesting there is no 
measurable difference in any direction between family and non-family firms with regards to their 
choice of leverage. 
One reservation regarding this conclusion is that this research only looks at a sample of 
the largest companies in the American economy.  It could be the case that in this size company, 
the market’s control mechanisms are effective, even though the company is majority-controlled 
or operated by family members.  Therefore, it is possible that examining a sample of smaller 
firms would yield the outcome that researchers are advocating – family businesses without a 
wide shareholder base make non-optimal capital structure choices.  This is not the case in this 
sample. 
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II.3.2 Risk Exposure 
To get a complete picture of the risk profile of the family business, it is important to look 
beyond leverage, at factors that reflect overall risk.   To evaluate these factors I use the Altman’s 
Z-Score, a predictive model developed by Dr. Edward Altman to measure the overall financial 
health of a company and can be used to determine the company’s probability of filing for 
bankruptcy in the next two years. The Z-score discriminant analysis is comprised of five 
different business ratios which include the following variables: Working Capital, Sales, Total 
Assets, Retained Earnings, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), Market Value of Equity 
and Book Value of Total Liabilities.  
Table 5 summarizes the results of the Z-score regressions.  The same five regressions as 
the leverage analysis were analyzed.  Nevertheless, the story revealed by this analysis is entirely 
different. The first two simple regressions show no indication for the significance of family 
business as an explanatory variable of the Z-score.  However, when introducing several 
interactions variables into the regressions (regressions 3-5), the family dummy is not only 
significant, but is also a high positive number.  The interaction variables do not contribute a 
meaningful explanation to the outcome, as they are mostly close to zero and insignificant.  This 
suggests that a family business is actually less risky than a non-family business, at any stage of 
the life cycle, at any size, and at any level of profitability. 
In addition to the Z-score I also analyze the Z’’-score, a development of the original Z-
score, which better fits non-manufacturing firms. The results (Table 6) are similar to those of the 
Z-score analysis. The family dummy is a robust and positive variable in the explanation of the 
Z’’-score. 
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Taking these outcomes into consideration, an interesting picture is revealed.  Although 
family firms do not have lower levels of leverage than non-family firms, they have lower overall 
financial risk and lower probability of failure. Since the Z-score and Z’’-score introduce 
variables that indicate operational outcomes of the company (e.g., Working Capital, EBIT and 
retained earnings), it is plausible that the source of the higher financial health stems from the 
operational management of these firms. This is a highly positive observation regarding the 
family business as an investment.  These companies do not have a sub-optimal structure 
compared to their peers as conventionally assumed, yet they manage to conduct their operations 
in a manner that exposes them to less risk.  An earlier observation made in this paper regarding 
the difference in profitability of family vs. non-family firms indicated that non-family firms are 
doing better than family firms on metrics of profitability (EBITDA Margin, ROE, and ROA).  
Taking these points together could indicate that the more conservative operation takes its toll on 
the companies’ profitability, but such conclusion requires a more thorough analysis of the 
difference in performance in the two types of companies, which is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
 
III. PART II – BANKRUPTCIES 
After evaluating the difference in risk related characteristics of family and non family 
firms, the second part of the paper attempts to answer the question: are family businesses more 
resilient than non family businesses in times of economic downturn and credit constraint?  Given 
the outcome of the first part of the paper, which indicates that family firms have similar capital 
structure but manage their operations in a less risky manner which results in a less risky 
company, the answer to the question is highly valuable. I look at a series of bankruptcy filings of 
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public companies in the US in the years 2004, 2006, and 2008 to evaluate the ratio of family to 
non-family companies in the sample.   These years were selected since they represent bear 
capital market environment (2008), as well as bull (2006) and stable (2004) markets in the US 
economy.  According to my hypothesis, bear economic periods will have a milder effect on 
family firms’ bankruptcies as they compare to other firms’ bankruptcies, due to lower inherent 
risk. 
III.1 Methodology 
I gather the data on bankruptcy filings of public firms in the US during the years 2004, 
2006, and 2008, using Capital IQ.  The sample includes 222 companies for which I collect data 
on bankruptcy date, industry, year founded, number of employees, market cap at bankruptcy, a 
list of large shareholders at bankruptcy, and a list of managers and board members at bankruptcy.  
I then manually identify each company as either family or non-family company.   
In determining the definition of a family company I follow the lead of many 
distinguished researchers in the field (Reeb and Anderson, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2004) and 
define a family business as follows: A company in which the founder or a member of his/her 
family are insiders (directors or managers); or a company in which the founder or a member of 
his/her family are blockholders in the company (hold 5% or more of shares outstanding). 
In order to categorize each firm as family or non-family, I use multiple information 
sources, including: company SEC filings (annual reports, bankruptcy filings, and insider 
holdings reports), company website, information provided with Capital IQ, public sources of 
business data such as Hoovers.com, and public sources of company history such as Wikipedia, 
Answers.com and newspapers articles.  For each company I find the names of the founder/s and 
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search whether at the time of bankruptcy the founder or a member of his/her family is an insider 
or a blockholder.  
After building a database of firms in which each company is categorized as either family 
or non-family company, I look at the proportion of family firms in each of the years.  I then use a 
T-test to evaluate whether there are significant differences between family and non-family 
companies with regards to two variables: the age of the firm, and the average number of 
employees.   I look at the age of the firm to attempt to distinguish between “young” and “old” 
firms, and as a proxy of generational succession; I use number of employees as a proxy for the 
company’s size, since the companies evaluated in the sample are bankrupt, and therefore 
traditional size estimates such as market cap, sales, or revenues are flawed representations of 
their actual size. 
III.2 Results 
Table 7 presents a summary of the sample, including the ratio of family firms in the 
sample under four different definition (family insiders/ blockholders, insiders only, blockholders 
only, and both insiders and blockholders).  
The ratios of family/ non family firms in the sample in each year are 32.7% in 2004, 
43.2% in 2006, and 45.5% in 2008.  This initial observation rejects the hypothesis of family 
firms being less likely to file for bankruptcy in years of difficult financial and economic 
conditions, as compared to years of growth or stagnation.  On the contrary, the ratio of family 
firms filing for bankruptcy is higher in 2008, which was a recession year.  However, when 
examining only the companies in which family ownership is in both involvement in management 
or board and significant holdings in the firm, the percentage of family firms is both materially 
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smaller and statistically significant in 2008 than in 2006.  Moreover, when considering the 
representation of family businesses in US economy, the findings of this study are very 
meaningful.  As mentioned in several research papers, approximately 90% of all businesses in 
the US are family businesses (Ibrahim and Elis, 1994, colli, 2003). In this sample only 41.9% 
(average over all three years examined) of the companies which filed for bankruptcy are family 
companies. Furthermore, using a narrower definition of a family firm which requires both insider 
and blockholder representation from the founding family, only 17.6% of the companies that have 
filed for bankruptcy in those three years are family firms. 
In Table 8 I take a closer look at some of the differences between family and non family 
firms in the sample.  Using a T-test I examine whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between family and non family companies with regards to age (are family firms on 
average younger than non-family?), and number of employees (are family firms on average 
smaller than non-family?). 
The results presented in table 8 show no significant difference between family and non 
family firms with regards to number of employees (although the difference is large).  When 
evaluating the age of the firms in the sample, it is apparent that family firms are younger on 
average.  A potential explanation for this significant difference is that many of the firms 
categorized as family firms following the definition I use in the study are start-ups or firms in an 
early stage in their life cycle.  Such young firms are at greater risk to fail as compared to more 
established firms; as a result, their inclusion in the sample creates a bias. 
Younger companies tend to have founder’s presence due to their phase in the life cycle 
and therefore are categorized as family companies in this sample. Yet these firms do not 
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necessarily share the characteristics associated with family firms, such as long term time horizon, 
succession planning considerations, and risk aversion.  For that reason, I test the results when 
keeping only firms that existed over 10 years at time of bankruptcy in the sample.  In Table 9, I 
essentially duplicate Table 7, but only include firms that were founded more than 10 years before 
the company filed for bankruptcy.  
In this narrower sample the representation of family firms decreases in each of the years, 
except for 2006.  In fact, using this sample the initial hypothesis of this paper is accepted.  In a 
year of financial crisis (2008) the ratio of family firms filing for bankruptcy is lower than in a 
year of economic prosperity (2006).  When using a narrower definition of family owned 
companies (both founding family insiders and blockholders), only 13.3% of the companies that 
filed for bankruptcy in 2008 are family owned. When compared to 2004 (13.5%) and 2006 
(26.5%), the results appear to further support the theory that family companies are better 
prepared to overcome periods of difficult financial environment. That being said, none of the 
differences has proven to be statistically significant, so the conclusions are not robust.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The unique characteristics of the family business are a popular research topic and a 
source for significant debate by scholars. The family company’s risk profile is considered to be 
one of the characteristics significantly impacting the management of the company. It is generally 
believed that families possess a more conservative attitude toward the management of the 
business, specifically the company’s financial structure and tendency to choose high risk 
projects. Following that logic, the goal of this research paper was to answer two questions: Is the 
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financial structure of the family company more conservative than that of a non-family company? 
And is the family company less risky than a non family company, and therefore more resilient to 
financial crises? 
The analysis conducted in this paper yields some interesting results regarding the risk 
profile of the family firm.  First, family companies do not have different capital structure than 
that of non-family firms. This is somewhat counter intuitive, as the prevailing perception and the 
starting point of this paper assumed that due to the unique set of consideration families have, the 
capital structure of the family firm would be more conservative. This was proven not to be the 
case.  One reservation is that this study was conducted on a database of large firms, making this 
statement not necessarily true within the broad realm of family firms.   
Second, family firms exhibit lower risk as captured by the Z-score and Z’’-score, two 
metrics which measure the overall level of financial risk inherent in a firm.  Z models include not 
only capital structure measures but also measures of operational efficiency (such as Working 
Capital, EBIT and Retained Earnings). The significant difference between family firms and non-
family firms on the Z-score scale indicates that the lower inherent risk of family firms stems 
from the operational aspect of the business. That is, although the capital structure is not 
materially different, family firms are managed with lower risk and higher overall financial 
health.  This conclusion is also apparent in the final part of the paper, in which bankruptcy data is 
analyzed to estimate the failure ratio of family firms as it compares to non-family firms.  
Although the majority of the analysis is not statistically significant, it still shows a considerably 
lower ratio of family firms that file for bankruptcy, compared to their representation in the 
economy.  Therefore, the lower risk that was apparent in the Z-score of family firms also 
translates to lower than expected bankruptcies of family firms.   
 
 
40
The findings of this study suggest that family firms, although they potentially suffer from 
various information and agency issues, are more financially healthy.  Surprisingly, this is true 
even without “paying the price” of a sub-optimal capital structure.   
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 V. EXHIBITS 
 
Table 1 ‐ Descriptive Statistics ‐ Independent Variables
Average SD Average SD Average SD T‐test
Age 94.2         42.6         94.1          44.3          94.4         37.7         (0.27)             0.7       0
Industry dummy
Consumer Discretionary 0.21         0.41         0.18          0.39          0.29         0.46         (0.10)             1.79     *
Consumer Staples 0.09         0.28         0.09          0.28          0.10         0.30         (0.01)             0.83     0
Energy 0.09         0.29         0.09          0.29          0.10         0.30         (0.00)             0.73     0
Healthcare 0.06         0.24         0.07          0.26          0.04         0.19         0.03              1.36     0
Industrials 0.28         0.45         0.31          0.46          0.19         0.40         0.12              2.07     **
Information Technology 0.04         0.20         0.04          0.19          0.06         0.24         (0.02)             1.11     0
Materials 0.18         0.39         0.18          0.38          0.19         0.40         (0.02)             0.83     0
Specialized Consumer Services 0.01         0.07         ‐            ‐            0.0           0.1           (0.02)             1.4       0
Number of Employees 63,828     156,623   60,486      76,451      72,889     276,029   (12,403)         0.9       0
Total Assets 31,716     90,308     31,054      75,500      33,511     122,682   (2,457)           0.8       0
Market Capitalization 20,524     44,013     23,725      47,586      11,844     31,167     11,881          2.3       **
Total Revenue  23,279     47,696     24,077      42,892      21,116     59,227     2,962            0.9       0
Net Income Margin %  4.5           15.4         4.8            14.6          3.5           17.5         1.3                1.0       0
EBITDA Margin % 15.9         10.9         16.9          11.2          13.4         9.9           3.5                2.3       **
Return on Equity %  13.0         41.8         16.1          42.2          4.5           39.5         11.7              2.0       **
Return on Assets % 6.8           5.1           7.3            5.0            5.7           5.2           1.5                2.1       **
Number of companies 193 141 52
Note: significance levels are denoted with asterisks: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
Non family‐Family
All Companies Non‐Family Companies Family Companies Difference in means
 
 
Table 2 ‐ Descriptive Statistics ‐ Dependent Variables
Average SD Average SD Average SD T‐test
Total Debt/Capital %  55.5         119.9       58.3          139.7        48.0         25.7         10.28            1.3       0
EBIT / Interest Exp.  14.48       20.06       14.65        20.53        13.96       18.80       0.69              0.81     0
Total Debt/EBITDA  2.94         4.73         2.84          4.84          3.22         4.46         (0.38)             1.01     0
5 Year Beta  1.32         0.76         1.31          0.76          1.32         0.75         (0.01)             0.73     0
Z Score  3.14         1.74         3.22          1.80          2.92         1.56         0.30              1.51     0
Z'' Score  3.56         2.37         3.62          2.39          3.39         2.33         0.24              1.11     0
Number of companies 193 141 52
Note: significance levels are denoted with asterisks: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
Non family‐Family
All Companies Non‐Family Companies Family Companies Difference in means
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Table 7 ‐ Sample Summary
2004 2006 2008 Total
Number of Companies 55 44 123 222
Family Ownership
Family Companies (%) 32.7% ** 43.2% 45.5% 41.9%
Family Insider (%) 32.7% 43.2% 42.3% 40.1%
Family Blockholder (%) 12.7% 29.5% * 18.7% 19.4%
Both Insider and Blockholder (%) 12.7% 29.5% ** 15.4% 17.6%
Note: significance levels  of the difference from the 2008 family/non‐family ratio are denoted with asterisks: 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
 
Table 8 ‐ Descriptive Statistics
2004 2006 2008 Total
Age
Average Age  (All Companies) 24.5 23.6 24.6 24.4
Average Age  (Non‐Family Companies) 27.8 23.3 30.4 28.3
Average Age  (Family Companies) 17.8 24.0 17.6 19.0
Difference (non family‐family) 10.0 ‐0.7 12.8 9.3
T‐Test 1.9 0.7 2.7 2.9
P‐Value 0.06 0.46 0.01 0.00
Employees
Average Number of Employees (All Companies) 1,060 955 2,032 1,349
Average Number of Employees (Non‐Family Compan 1242 1191 2530 1901
Average Number of Employees (Family Companies) 626 493 1145 911
Difference (non family‐family) 616 698 1385 990
T‐Test 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6
P‐Value 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.11
Number of Companies 55 44 123 222
 
Table 9 ‐ Companies older than 10 years
2004 2006 2008 Total
Number of Companies 37 34 75 146
Family Ownership
Family Companies (%) 27.0% 44.1% 36.0% 35.6%
Family Insider (%) 27.0% 44.1% 34.7% 34.9%
Family Blockholder (%) 13.5% 26.5% 14.7% 17.1%
Both Insider and Blockholder (%) 13.5% 26.5% 13.3% 16.4%
Note: significance levels  of the difference from the 2008 family/non‐family ratio are denoted with asterisks: 
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic boom that peaked in the first half of 2007 was marked by seemingly 
limitless optimism. Academic reflections and criticisms frequently point to such representative 
examples as Tishman Speyer Properties’ $5.4 billion purchase of Stuyvesant Town and Peter 
Cooper Village or the perplexing ratings of collateralized debt obligations. Another fascinating, 
albeit less frequently discussed, illustration of financial exuberance was the rapid escalation of 
first-lien covenant lite loan issuances and the corresponding valuation by secondary-market 
purchasers. For example, in May 2007 the average bid price for covenant lite leveraged loans 
was within 0.01 cents of the average bid price for all other first-lien leveraged loans, indicating 
that secondary-market investors attached essentially zero value to the existence of maintenance 
covenants.1  
Of the literature that does exist with respect to covenant lite loan issuances, much of it 
contemplates the topic from the perspective of the lenders (banks). This paper will attempt to 
present the opposite point of view and identify four potential sources of future value that first-
lien covenant lite debt provides to the borrower: (1) the value of eliminating interest ratcheting 
and forbearance fees to waive maintenance covenant violations; (2) the opportunity for the 
borrower to repurchase covenant lite debt at lower prices than if it had issued traditional first-lien 
debt; (3) the ability to delay bankruptcy and the associated restructuring costs; and (4) the 
opportunity to extend the above advantages by means of debt reinstatement. In order to mitigate 
the abstractness of the topic, this paper will examine two hypothetical companies that received 
debt financing in early 2007: one which procured covenant lite first-lien bank debt and the other 
whose bank debt featured traditional maintenance covenants. We will assume that each 
                                                            
1 “Average Bid of Leveraged Loans.” Chart. Standard and Poor’s LCD and S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index. Standard & 
Poor’s Financial Services LLC (S&P), 2009. 
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company’s financial performance fell outside levels specified by the latter’s covenants at the end 
of 2008.  
II. BACKGROUND 
II.1 What is First-Lien Covenant Lite Bank Debt? 
 Broadly speaking, a loan of this nature can be broken down into three points of 
characterization: (1) bank debt, (2) first-lien, and (3) covenant lite.  
 Bank Debt: As its name suggests, bank debt is a form of debt financing in which a 
banking institution is the lender. Bank debt facilities are comprised of a term loan, a revolving 
credit facility, or some combination of the two.2 The entirety of a term loan is funded upfront, 
with payments of principal permanently reducing the balance.3 Term loans typically amortize 
over the life of the loan, requiring the borrower to pay off principal (in addition to interest) at an 
agreed upon schedule. Frequently, term loans only partially amortize so that there remains a 
significant principal balance (a balloon payment) due at the end. At this point, the borrower can 
choose to pay off the remaining principal with its own funds or refinance the loan with new debt. 
A revolving credit facility, on the other hand, lacks a defined repayment schedule. Revolving 
credit facilities are “generally structured to finance the borrower’s working capital needs.”4 
Draw down, or the maximum borrowing potential, at any given point is typically defined
borrowing base formula which takes into account the liquidation value of the collateral and is 
capped at the maximum borrowing capacity stipulated by the loan agreement.
 by a 
                                                           
5  
 First-Lien: First-lien debt is the most senior security in a company’s capital structure. 
While there are specific exceptions, the absolute priority rule generally dictates that in the event 
 
2 Moyer, Stephen G. Distressed Debt Analysis: Strategies for Speculative Investors. Boca Raton, Fla.: J. Ross, 2005. 306. Print. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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of a bankruptcy, creditors receive payment for their claims in accordance with the seniority of 
the securities they hold. That is, first-lien bank creditors receive payment in full prior to second-
lien creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity shareholders receiving any payment. By definition, 
first-lien debt is secured by all or some of a borrower’s assets. The credit agreement specifies 
which assets serve as collateral for the debt. 
 Covenant Lite: Covenants refer to the contractual obligations in the credit agreement that 
set forth specific standards of future conduct and performance for the borrower.6 Affirmative 
covenants require that the borrower take certain actions or meet minimum performance levels 
while negative covenants prohibit the borrower from taking certain actions or exceeding 
maximum threshold levels.7 Although covenants may cover everything from compliance with 
laws to maintaining insurance,8 this paper focuses on financial covenants – those covenants 
which dictate minimum and maximum financial performance levels.  
Financial covenants can be further broken down into maintenance covenants and 
incurrence covenants.9 Maintenance covenants are financial covenants that must be met on an 
ongoing basis throughout the term of a loan (e.g., quarterly) while incurrence covenants are only 
effective if and when the borrower performs a specified action (such as increases debt or 
acquires another company).10 Standard & Poor’s defines covenant lite loans as those which 
feature incurrence covenants but have no maintenance covenants (“pure” covenant lite) and 
extends consideration to loans which have maintenance covenants that are “effectively 
meaningless” because the “headroom exceeds the normal market standard,” thus making a 
                                                            
6 Paglia, John K. “An Overview of Covenants in Large Bank Loans.” RMA Journal (Mar. 2002). BNET. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. 
7 Wise, J. Eric. “Banking and Finance Market Snapshot: A Beginner’s Guide to Thinking about Covenants.” Kramer Levin 
Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Dec. 2006. Web. 8 Mar. 2010.  
8 Id. 
9 Wise, “Banking and Finance Market Snapshot: A Beginner’s Guide to Thinking about Covenants.”  
10 Lai, Ana, and Steven M. Bavaria. The Leveraging Of America: Covenant-Lite Loan Structures Diminish Recovery Prospects. 
Rep. Standard & Poor’s, 18 July 2007. Web. 8 Mar. 2010. 
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technical default highly unlikely even if the borrower’s operating performance deteriorates.11 
This is the definition that shall be used for this paper, though it should be noted that others may 
prefer to adopt a broader definition of covenant lite so as to allow a maximum of one or two 
financial maintenance covenants.12  
  
II.2 The Rise of First-Lien Covenant Lite Bank Debt 
 As investors’ appetites for loans grew in 2006 and early 2007, the market became flooded 
with available cash. Aptly stated in a December 2006 Bloomberg news article, “[s]o much 
money is available that investors are lowering their standards.”13 This idea of lowered standards 
ultimately manifested itself in the form of increased covenant lite debt issuances. With the 
default rate of speculative-grade debt at a mere 2% at the end of 2006,14 creditors remained 
optimistic that they would continue to collect on their covenant lite debt. 
Although covenant lite debt had been available to borrowers for many years, the number 
of issuances in 2007 dwarfed that of the preceding decade. From 1997 through 2006, a total of 
$32 billion in covenant lite loans were issued,15 with approximately three-quarters of that 
coming from 2006.16 In the first 6 months of 2007, covenant lite volume exploded to $97 
billion.17 This represented 32% of all loan issuances for the period (as compared to 8% for th
comparable period in the year prior).
e 
t lite 
                                                           
18 An even more staggering statistic is that covenan
 
11 Id. 
12 Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch. “Memorandum Submitted by Deutsche Bank.” www.parliament.uk. United Kingdom 
Parliament, 22 Aug. 2007. Web. 08 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmtreasy/567/567we40.htm>. 
13 Rubinroit, Harris. “Bank Loans Lure KKR, Carlyle with Junk-Bond Returns (Update2).”Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg L.P., 27 
Dec. 2006. Web. 25 Mar. 2010. 
14 Id. 
15 Rubinroit, Harris, and Darrell Hassler. “Goldman, Lee Stymied as Investors Jettison Covenants (Update1).” Bloomberg.com. 
Bloomberg L.P., 9 May 2007. Web. 8 Mar. 2010. 
16 Lai, Ana, and Steven M. Bavaria. The Leveraging Of America: Covenant-Lite Loan Structures Diminish Recovery Prospects. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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loans represented almost one-fifth of all bank debt outstanding at their peak, up from a mere 1% 
at the beginning of 2006.19 Unfortunately for borrowers, the abundant availability of covenan
lite loans abruptly came to an end as market conditions weakened in the latter half of 200
t 
7.  
                                                           
 
III. ANALYSIS 
As previously noted, this paper will explore the value of covenant lite first-lien debt to 
borrowers in the context of two hypothetical companies: CovCo and CovLite. Each featured an 
enterprise value of $1 billion20 and borrowed $500 million in first-lien bank debt21 on January 1, 
2007 (so as to approximate a typical LBO deal in 2006 or early 2007). CovCo’s credit agreement 
included standard affirmative maintenance covenants defining the minimum current ratio, 
minimum net working capital, minimum interest coverage ratio, and minimum net worth, as well 
as negative maintenance covenants denoting a maximum debt/worth ratio, maximum total debt, 
maximum capital expenditures, and maximum dividends.22 Antithetically, maintenance 
covenants were completely absent from CovLite’s credit agreement. 
 
III.1 The Value of Eliminating Maintenance Covenant Violations 
By the end of 2008, CovCo and CovLite experienced a significant decline in revenue as 
market conditions worsened. The two companies’ EBITDA to interest expense ratio slipped 
below levels deemed acceptable by CovCo’s affirmative maintenance covenant. The result was 
 
19 Lattman, Peter. “‘Covenant-Lite’ Loans Face Heavy Hits.” WSJ.com. The Wall Street Journal, 18 Mar. 2009. Web. 8 Mar. 
2010. 
20 Grocer, Stephen. “August: Month of the Shrinking Deal.” WSJ.com. The Wall Street Journal, 11 Sept. 2007. Web. 8 Mar. 
2010. 
21 Blaydon, Colin, and Fred Wainwright. “The Balance Between Debt and Added Value.” FT.com. The Financial Times Ltd., 28 
Sept. 2006. Web. 8 Mar. 2010. 
22 Strischek, Dev. “Coming to Terms with Financial Covenants.” RMA Journal (June 2007). BNET. Web. 7 Mar. 2010.  
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that CovCo was in technical default of its credit agreement while CovLite could continue to 
conduct business as usual without interference from its lenders.  
Credit agreements typically state that the borrower’s violation of any covenant allows the 
bank to accelerate the maturity of the loan.23 In practice, however, the bank and the borrower 
frequently reach a compromise in the form of an amended agreement. Given the powerful 
negotiating leverage that covenants afford the lender, the absence of maintenance covenant 
violation penalties encompasses the most direct and tangible value to covenant lite borrowers. In 
order to produce a baseline quantification of this value, data was collected on 31 instances of 
interest ratcheting on senior credit facilities in 2008 and 2009. For the purposes of selecting the 
data, only instances in which there was an explicitly stated change of interest (such as from 
prime + 300 bps to prime + 500 bps) were used. Credit agreement amendments which made less 
transparent modifications to the interest rate (such as changing the definition of “Base Rate” or 
swapping LIBOR for prime) were not used. Revolvers and term loans of the same borrower were 
considered separately. Public filings (predominantly 10-Qs and 10-Ks), news articles, and 
company press releases were utilized to obtain all information relating to this analysis. 
The results indicate that interest ratcheting arises from one of three circumstances: (1) a 
borrower is in technical default for violating one or more covenants and a default rate of interest 
becomes effective in accordance with the credit agreement, (2) a borrower is in technical default 
for violating one or more covenants and receives a waiver from the lender in exchange for an 
increased interest rate and perhaps other forms of consideration, or (3) a borrower anticipates 
that it will be in technical default for violating one or more covenants and negotiates with the 
lender to prospectively avoid the violation. On average, the above events result in an increase in 
the interest rate of 194.44 bps, with increases ranging from 50 bps to 450 bps (see Exhibit 1). 
                                                            
23 Id. 
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However, as noted, this represents only a baseline cost to violating borrowers. In addition, they 
are frequently required to consent to additional covenants (though, some requirements and 
restrictions are reduced so as to preclude the borrower’s immediate violation upon signing the 
amendment or forbearance agreement), pay forbearance fees, or pay down a portion of the loan’s 
principal. In some cases, these additional costs are quite substantial. For instance, forbearance 
fees generally range from 0.25% to 2.00% of the loan balance.24 
  
III.2 The Opportunity for the Borrower to Repurchase Covenant Lite Debt at Lower Prices 
than if it had Issued Traditional First-Lien Debt 
 At the time the hypothetical loans were signed, the average bid price for covenant lite 
loans on the secondary market was actually about 0.2 cents on the dollar higher than the average 
bid price for all other first-lien leveraged loans.25 This was an entirely counterintuitive and 
irrational (but also short-lived) phenomenon. It meant that investors were willing to pay more for 
covenant lite first-lien debt (100.29 cents on the dollar as of 12/29/2006) than otherwise 
comparable first-lien debt featuring traditional maintenance covenants (100.10 cents on the 
dollar).26 From the beginning of 2006 through June 2007, the average bids for covenant lite debt 
and all other first-lien debt stayed within 0.4 cents of each other.27 However, in the months and 
years that followed, as realization set in that covenant lite could mean drastically reduced 
recoveries for the ultimate holder of the debt, the spread between average bids continued to 
fluctuate in accordance with market conditions but consistently in favor of the traditional first-
lien variety (see Exhibit 2). 
                                                            
24 Solomon, Jordan S. “Negotiating Forbearance Agreements.” www.gibbonslaw.com. Gibbons P.C., 7 Apr. 2009. Web. 09 Mar. 
2010.  
25 “Average Bid of Leveraged Loans.” Chart. Standard and Poor’s LCD and S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index. Standard & 
Poor’s Financial Services LLC (S&P), 2009. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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 Let’s imagine that CovCo and CovLite desired to buy back $250 million of their bank 
debt (face value) on the secondary market at the beginning of 2009 in order to reduce ongoing 
interest payments and avoid bankruptcy. CovLite would spend about $21 million less than 
CovCo on account of the difference in trading values. This would have represented a cost 
savings equivalent to 2.11% of CovLite’s original enterprise value.  
Table 1: Hypothetical January 2009 Debt Repurchase ($250 Million Face Value) 
  CovCo  CovLite 
Average Bid (1/2/2009)28 65.7902¢  57.3310¢ 
Cost to Company $164,475,500.00  $143,327,500.00 
 
 While this would appear to be a simple choice for a wide range of companies with bank 
debt trading at cheap prices, there are actually a host of legal and tax considerations involved that 
may preclude the company, or even the private equity sponsor,29 from repurchasing loans on a 
secondary market. In general, the ability for a borrower to repurchase its own debt in this fashion 
should not be considered an automatic right.30 The borrower may be required to amend the credit 
agreement (which may entail amendment fees), as was the case with Citadel Broadcasting and 
Harrah’s Entertainment, or seek lender consent.31  
 
III.3 The Present Value of Delaying Restructuring Costs 
 A primary argument for the inclusion of maintenance covenants is their ability to 
safeguard the interests of the lender. The requirements and restrictions set forth an expectation of 
performance that a borrower must meet. A covenant violation, which leaves the borrower in 
technical default, allows the lender to accelerate the loan and potentially force the borrower into 
                                                            
28 Id. 
29 “Private Equity Investments in Portfolio Company Debt: An Overview of Legal Issues.” Simpson Thacher’s Client 
Memorandum (13 Feb. 2009). www.simpsonthacher.com. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. Web. 9 Mar. 2010. 
30 Razin, Ely. “Credit Terms: Loan Buyback? Bring Out The Vote.” Web. WestlawBusiness.com. Thomson Reuters, 27 May 
2009. Web. 9 Mar. 2010. 
31 Id. 
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bankruptcy. This is an immensely powerful bargaining chip for the lender. Recall earlier that 
CovCo violated its interest coverage ratio covenant at the end of 2008. Instead of amending the 
credit agreement, let’s now imagine that CovCo’s lender decided to accelerate the loan. Given its 
poor financial condition and the illiquidity of the credit market at the time, CovCo was unable to 
come up with the capital to pay off the loan in its entirety and was forced into bankruptcy.  
 A comprehensive study on chapter 11 bankruptcy fees found that large debtors 
(averaging about $1.2 billion in assets plus debts) pay fees equivalent to 4.53% of their assets 
and debts for a corporate reorganization.32 Assuming that this number for CovCo was $1 billion 
at the time of bankruptcy, it would have paid out $45.3 million in total fees and expenses. 
CovLite, though in a similarly precarious financial position, was able to continue in the ordinary 
course of business as long as it could make the required debt service payments. Even if it could 
only manage this for one additional year and assuming a discount rate of 7%, the present value of 
that delay in restructuring costs would have been worth more than $3 million. This savings 
would have been further augmented by the present value of delaying or mitigating intangible 
costs (damage to reputation, damage to relationships with suppliers and customers, etc.).  
 
 
III.4 The Opportunity to Extend the Aforementioned Advantages Via Debt Reinstatement 
 The ability to avoid technical default and delay bankruptcy confers additional benefits to 
CovLite beyond what the previous present value calculation suggests. In cases where the act of 
filing for bankruptcy constitutes the sole reason for default (that is, the debtor is up to date on all 
interest and principal payments and is not in breach of a loan’s covenants), a debtor may seek to 
                                                            
32 Lubben, Stephen J. “Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees.” 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 77 (2008). 
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“reinstate” its senior loans33 under §1124 of the Bankruptcy Code34 against the wishes of those 
lenders. This means that a borrower with covenant lite debt is more likely to have this option 
than one subject to traditional maintenance covenants. Debt reinstatement allows a debtor to 
preserve the entirety of the secured debt (its interest rate, term, covenants, etc.) rather than seek 
then-current market terms, but only if “the lenders' legal and equitable rights would be 
unaffected after the bankruptcy case and that all defaults would be cured by the plan's effective 
date, i.e., the lenders would have the full benefit of their prepetition bargain notwithstanding the 
intervening bankruptcy.”35 
 Given the time cushion that the absence of maintenance covenants provided for CovLite, 
it had much greater flexibility in choosing to file for bankruptcy prior to being in technical 
default. This option can yield substantial cost savings for the debtor. For example, in late 2009 
Charter Communications Inc. was allowed to reinstate its secured debt against the wishes of 
those lenders, thus preserving the below-market interest rate and saving the company 
approximately $500m annually in interest expenses.36 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
33 Analysis Group. “Reinstatement and Bankruptcy Litigation: A Q&A with Affiliate Robert Grien and Managing Principal 
Maureen Chakraborty.” www.ag-inc.com. Analysis Group. Web. 10 Mar. 2010. 
34 Hedberg, Steven M. “Reinstatement: How Valuable is Below-Market Secured Debt? A Closer Look at ‘In Re: Charter 
Communications.’” Law.com. ALM Media Properties, LLC, 5 Nov. 2009. Web. 10 Mar. 2010. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 As this paper has shown, the value of covenant lite debt extends well beyond the 
avoidance of increased interest rates and one time fees resulting from covenant violations.  
Table 2: Traditional Debt versus Covenant Lite Debt - Summary 
 
 
 
Traditional First-Lien Debt Covenant Lite First-Lien Debt 
   
Interest 
Ratcheting 
 
Companies face an average interest rate 
increase of 194.44 bps for financial 
maintenance covenant violations (or in 
anticipation of such violations). This is often 
accompanied by one-time forbearance fees, 
mandatory principal repayments, and/or other 
amendments to the loan agreement. 
Maintenance covenants are absent from the 
loan agreement. Therefore, these costs are not 
applicable to covenant lite borrowers. 
   
Debt 
Repurchase 
As of 01/15/2010, the average bid price for 
traditional first-lien leveraged loans on the 
secondary market was 93.24 cents on the 
dollar. 37  
As of 01/15/2010, the average bid price for 
covenant lite first-lien leveraged loans on the 
secondary market was 91.19 cents on the 
dollar. Average bids for covenant lite debt have 
remained lower than traditional debt bids since 
mid-2007. 38 
   
Bankruptcy 
Timing 
Maintenance covenants increase the likelihood 
that a borrower will find itself in technical 
default, allowing the lender to accelerate the 
maturity of the loan and potentially force the 
borrower into bankruptcy. On average, 
corporate reorganizations will cost large 
debtors 4.53% of assets plus debts in total fees 
and expenses.39 
The absence of maintenance covenants 
increases a borrower’s ability to delay (or 
potentially avoid) bankruptcy. The present 
value of delaying reorganization costs can be 
quite substantial. 
   
Debt 
Reinstatement 
Debt reinstatement is not an option where the 
debtor is in breach of the loan’s covenants. 
The absence of maintenance covenants 
provides a borrower additional flexibility in 
entering bankruptcy prior to being in technical 
default. This leaves open the possibility of debt 
reinstatement to preserve a loan’s favorable 
interest rate and covenant lite status. 
 
CovLite, much like many of the companies that were fortunate enough to borrow covenant lite 
first-lien bank debt in 2006 and 2007, was additionally presented with a variety of very powerful 
                                                            
37 “Average Bid of Leveraged Loans.” Chart. Standard and Poor’s LCD and S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index. Standard & 
Poor’s Financial Services LLC (S&P), 2009. 
38 Id. 
39 Lubben, Stephen J. “Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees.” 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 77 (2008). 
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options. Depending on the state of the market (and subject to the various other considerations 
previously discussed), it could have chosen to repurchase its own debt at a price significantly 
lower than if it had traditional bank debt. In the event that bankruptcy was imminent, CovLite 
had improved flexibility in delaying the costs associated with the reorganization and pursuing 
debt reinstatement as an option. Overall, these benefits not only provide real, quantifiable cost 
savings to a covenant lite borrower, but also allow management to focus on an effective long-
term corporate strategy without disruption from short-term covenant requirements and 
restrictions. 
Despite the adverse implications of covenant lite lending, banks in 2010 appear to be 
warming up to the idea once again. In January 2010, Hexion Specialty Chemicals was allowed to 
refinance its existing covenant-lite debt without adding restrictions.40 As of March 2010, 
Lyondell Chemical Co.’s chapter 11 exit financing package includes a $500 million covenant lite 
term loan.41 Prospective borrowers should remain cognizant of the potential sources of value 
attributable to covenant lite bank debt and negotiate against maintenance covenants accordingly. 
                                                            
40 Greene, Katherine. “Cov-Lite Loans Make a Return: High Demand as Lyondell Pares Yield; Skittish No More?” WSJ.com. 
The Wall Street Journal, 26 Mar. 2010. Web. 26 Mar. 2010. 
41 Id. 
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Exhibit 1: Interest Rate Increases in Response to (or in Anticipation of) Covenant Violations 
Sample Size 31
Average Increase 194.44 bps
Median 200 bps
High 450 bps
Low 50 bps
Standard Deviation 106.36 bps
Standard Error 19.10 bps
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Average Bid Premium of Traditional First-Lien Leveraged Loans over Covenant Lite 
First-Lien Leveraged Loans* 
 
*Derived from data provided by Miyer A. Levy of Standard & Poor’s LCD (Source: Standard & Poor’s LCD and S&P/LSTA 
 Leveraged Loan Index). Data excludes all facilities in default. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
While classification of gold mining companies can be somewhat ambiguous, PDAC 
[Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada] (2009), one of the preeminent authorities in 
mining, provides the following description: “Mining companies are defined largely by the way in 
which they derive their revenues. A senior producer or operator generates its revenues from the 
production and sale of the commodity it is mining. A junior mining company has no mining 
operations and is essentially a venture capital company. It must rely almost entirely on the capital 
markets to finance its exploration activities. There is another category: mid-tier producers. These 
are generally junior companies that have decided to go into production on properties that they 
have discovered” (¶ 2).  
From the financial markets viewpoint, there are certain drawbacks and advantages to 
being a junior gold miner as opposed to a well-diversified mining company. On one hand, junior 
miners exploring purely/predominantly for gold enjoy a lower discount rate (i.e., lower cost of 
capital) due to lower asset beta, stand to capture the upside of the increase in gold price (if 
unhedged), can exercise downside protection with ease (by having to hedge exposure to one 
liquidly traded metal) and have a revenue stream which is somewhat inflation-protected. On the 
other hand, juniors have to rely solely on external sources of financing (which, as the last two 
years have demonstrated, can tighten rapidly), face the threat of drops in gold prices if unhedged 
and do not enjoy the diversification of exposure to a variety of metals which are not always 
perfectly correlated.         
Industry insiders have suggested that the recent credit crunch has disproportionately 
affected junior gold miners’ ability to draw on capital markets financing, an activity which is 
essential to their ongoing operations as per PDAC. “Few have been harder hit by the global 
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recession than the small miners and explorers that depend so much on external financing to 
survive until they can discover the mineral troves that can be sold on to bigger players” (Jordan, 
2009, ¶ 2). Since the rock bottom of the crisis [defined for purposes of this research as the period 
commencing in August of 2008 with events leading up to Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and lasting through present day] the number of public 
and private placements has shrunk considerably (aggregate Capital IQ data). According to 
Haywood Securities Mining Team (2008), “companies [were] faced with near-term financing 
requirements complicated by uncertain access to affordable equity given current capital market 
conditions” (p. 8) at that time. 
Policies of fiscal easing put in place by major Western economies in an effort to overcome 
the recent credit crunch resulted in a gradually swelling monetary base chasing a steady supply of 
physical goods. This made inflation – if not immediately then in the near future – likely. Coupled 
with the weakening U.S. dollar, this boosted the outlook for the price of gold, the traditional 
physical haven for investors in time of inflation (Gold Stock Strategist, 2009, ¶ 8).  
Thus it appeared that junior gold miners, as part of the broader gold market, found 
themselves in a favorable position to raise the financing. Furthermore, they stood to capture the 
premium – compared to the same peer group of companies in the past – that investors would now 
be willing to pay based on the expected increase in the value of the physical gold underground. 
An opinion by Money Morning Staff supported this viewpoint: “[I]nformed investors know that 
hard assets, and tangible natural resources, have always provided the best protection against the 
ravages of the U.S. Treasury’s printing press” (2009, ¶ 30).  
Increased inflationary pressures and positive gold price outlook also increased demand on 
the investor side, and with limited supply of established gold producers, explorers and pre-
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producers that did not have access to capital markets in the past were increasingly able to raise 
financing. “Investors are courageously committing capital, especially in return for unsecured 
common shares, clearly expecting healthy returns in the coming years” (Money Morning Staff, 
2009, ¶ 27). 
Analysis of professional literature suggests the following levers via which capital raising 
may affect value of junior gold mining firms: 
1) Certainty of Production–“[junior miners] with promise of near-term gold 
production..have the best shot at accessing capital” (Money Morning Staff, 2009, ¶ 20) 
2) Time Management–miners believe time is of the essence given uncertainty of future 
commodity prices and time value of money 
3) Gold Prices–current fiscal policy of major industrial nations makes inflation likely. In 
such environment, gold prices historically grow, and there is a sense of urgency to 
produce in order to take advantage of the trend 
4) Asset Preservation–the ability to raise cash ensures that the company will not have to 
resort to the sale of some of its valuable assets to develop others 
5) ‘Chicken-or-Egg’ phenomenon–while raising cash enables companies to move closer 
to production, the closer you are to production already, the easier it is to raise cash – 
thus, equity issuance is in effect the market’s endorsement of pre-transaction viability 
One more factor that is generally considered crucial to the value of a mining operation is 
the quality of management. If managers have a proven track record with other projects, the 
probability of their current undertaking being successful increases. While it is an industry 
standard to value gold explorers using NAV (Net Asset Value) of their reserves, recognized 
industry expert Dr. Victor Rudenno (2009) further suggests that “any increase in share price is not 
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so much a reflection of the additional reserves, but of management’s ability to convert them into 
future earnings” (p. 284). 
This industry review sets the stage for the investigation of what factors, if any, determine 
how the market puts value on equity issuance by junior gold miners. In its Junior Precious Metals 
Industry Comments, the Haywood Securities Mining Team (2008) succinctly describes projects 
that are sufficiently advanced to be in a first mover position ‘when investor interest returns’ as 
those which “are well funded, [have] seasoned management teams and attractive development 
stage projects” (p. 1). This study will attempt to analyze how features of an equity financing event 
such as dilution percentage, prior stock performance, warrant issuance, presence or absence of 
producing facilities and underwriters’ domicile influence the magnitude of this effect.  
 
II. HYPOTHESIS 
This study sets out to examine how factors such as dilution percentage, prior stock performance, 
warrant issuance, presence or absence of producing facilities and underwriters’ domicile influence 
the market’s valuation of junior gold mining companies upon announcement of equity issuance. 
Thus, the null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
change in the stock price (dependent variable) and each of the factors listed above (independent 
variables). This hypothesis will be tested via an empirical examination of the closing share price 
one day before and on the day of the announcement, and a multiple regression against the factors 
outlined above 
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III. DATA SELECTION 
III.1    SAMPLE SELECTION 
Data in this sample was gathered from Capital IQ database over the course of the research 
using the following Screening Criteria 
‐ Primary Industry Classification: ‘Gold Ores’  
‐ Market Capitalization: $100 - $800 million as of latest screening date 
‐ Listing: publicly listed on Major US Exchanges, LSE, TSX, TSXV, JSE 
‐ Transactions: public (Common Stock, ADR Common Stock, Preferred Stock, Convertible 
Preferred Stock) and private (Convertible Equity, Rule 144A, Individual Investors 
Participated, Bought Deal, Registered Direct Offering, Equity Line, Pre-IPO) 
‐ Time Frame: transactions announced and closed between 8/1/2008 and 3/30/10 
‐ Benchmark Index: ARC:GDX index Market Vectors ETF Trust - Gold Miners ETF is an 
exchange traded fund launched and managed by Van Eck Associates Corporation. It invests in 
the public equity markets across the globe. The fund invests in stocks of companies operating 
in the gold mining sector. It invests in stocks of companies across all market capitalizations 
with market capitalizations greater than $100 million. The fund replicates the Amex Gold 
Miners Index by investing in companies of that index in approximately the same proportion. 
Market Vectors ETF Trust - Gold Miners ETF was founded on May 16, 2006 and is domiciled 
in the United States (Source: Capital IQ). 
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III.2    SAMPLE 
The sample for this study, compiled as per selection criteria above, includes firms which 
have announced and closed equity issuance transactions, both public and private, between August 
1, 2008 and March 30, 2010. The sample has been further divided into two sub-samples: 
 
1. Firms (33 total, market cap in the $101.2 - $759.1 mm range as of transaction date) which have 
entered into public transactions (42 total, total transaction value in the $2.1 - $135.8 range) 
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02/17/2010 02/26/2010 OceanaGold Corporation ASX:OGC 2.10 2.19 4.25% 44.91 44.71 -0.45% 4.70%    52.69  456.7 11.54% 468.12% 21.38% 446.74%     0       1         1 
01/28/2010 02/11/2010 B2gold Corporation TSX:BTO 1.24 1.19 -4.19% 42.77 42.17 -1.40% -2.79%      23.7  419.0 5.66% 141.24% 30.68% 110.57%     0       1         1 
01/14/2010 01/29/2010 Brett Resources Inc. TSXV:BBR 2.14 2.28 6.76% 48.86 48.60 -0.53% 7.29%    24.47  208.9 11.71% 382.59% 73.26% 309.33%     0       0         1 
01/13/2010 01/26/2010 Premier Gold Mines Limited TSX:PG 4.04 3.89 -3.71% 48.35 48.86 1.05% -4.76%    30.17  362.2 8.33% 200.59% 63.79% 136.80%     0       0         1 
01/11/2010 01/19/2010 Guyana Goldfields Inc. TSX:GUY 7.93 7.85 -0.91% 49.84 50.17 0.66% -1.57%    67.34  419.5 16.05% 378.49% 72.16% 306.33%     0       0         0 
12/03/2009 12/10/2009 Golden Star Resources, Ltd. AMEX:GSS 4.23 4.19 -0.95% 54.78 53.53 -2.28% 1.34%      75.0  759.1 9.88% 713.46% 127.68% 585.78%     0       1         1 
11/20/2009 12/03/2009 Avion Gold Corporation TSXV:AVR 0.44 0.39 -12.11% 51.10 50.82 -0.55% -11.56%    19.01  176.7 10.76% 1317.07% 180.77% 1136.30%     0       0         1 
11/17/2009 12/03/2009 Keegan Resources Inc. TSX:KGN 5.98 5.91 -1.07% 51.34 51.53 0.37% -1.44%      34.2  226.0 15.13% 952.54% 161.14% 791.40%     0       0         1 
11/13/2009 12/18/2009 Allied Gold Ltd. ASX:ALD 0.39 0.38 -2.77% 48.44 49.78 2.77% -5.54%  135.78  286.6 47.38% 171.79% 123.64% 48.15%     0       1         1 
11/11/2009 12/16/2009 Regis Resources Limited ASX:RRL 0.48 0.56 16.79% 49.66 49.90 0.48% 16.31%    23.55  270.2 8.72% 814.41% 129.49% 684.92%     0       0         0 
11/11/2009 12/10/2009 ST Barbara Ltd. ASX:SBM 0.33 0.33 0.00% 49.66 49.90 0.48% -0.48%  113.87  477.8 23.83% 122.42% 129.49% -7.07%     0       1         0 
11/09/2009 11/19/2009 Exeter Resource Corporation TSX:XRC 5.75 5.95 3.35% 47.62 49.28 3.49% -0.14%      46.9  545.0 8.61% 255.32% 105.70% 149.62%     0       0         1 
11/03/2009 11/16/2009 Andina Minerals, Inc. TSXV:ADM 1.68 1.81 8.06% 42.88 46.18 7.70% 0.36%    23.91  161.0 14.85% 127.70% 104.09% 23.61%     1       0         1 
10/29/2009 12/04/2009 Troy Resources NL ASX:TRY 2.22 2.21 -0.70% 41.87 43.80 4.61% -5.31%    22.79  169.5 13.45% 232.55% 100.72% 131.83%     0       1         1 
09/30/2009 10/15/2009 Colossus Minerals Inc. TSX:CSI 4.45 5.49 23.19% 44.46 45.29 1.87% 21.32%    61.36  311.5 19.70% 320.92% 31.58% 289.34%     0       0         1 
09/25/2009 10/30/2009 Apex Minerals NL ASX:AXM 0.08 0.05 -35.31% 43.74 43.07 -1.53% -33.78%    97.98  102.2 95.87% -75.62% 20.16% -95.78%     1       1         0 
09/17/2009 09/21/2009 Minefinders Corp. Ltd. TSX:MFL 10.61 10.05 -5.30% 48.00 47.78 -0.46% -4.84%    61.09  680.4 8.98% 71.37% 40.76% 30.61%     0       1         1 
09/08/2009 09/15/2009 Vista Gold Corp. AMEX:VGZ 2.42 2.41 -0.41% 45.02 45.11 0.20% -0.61%      19.8  101.2 19.57% -11.68% 45.51% -57.19%     0       0         0 
08/31/2009 09/22/2009 Greystar Resources Ltd. TSX:GSL 3.63 3.50 -3.58% 40.18 39.51 -1.67% -1.91%    51.46  368.4 13.97% 89.10% 13.99% 75.11%     1       0         1 
07/23/2009 08/06/2009 Romarco Minerals Inc. TSXV:R 0.79 0.81 2.59% 39.77 39.96 0.48% 2.11%    37.22  538.9 6.91% 369.65% -10.77% 380.42%     0       0         1 
06/29/2009 07/15/2009 B2gold Corporation TSX:BTO 0.69 0.66 -4.20% 39.20 39.15 -0.13% -4.07%    22.35  340.9 6.56% -38.44% -19.32% -19.12%     0       1         1 
06/17/2009 07/03/2009 Brett Resources Inc. TSXV:BBR 0.67 0.61 -8.58% 38.37 38.23 -0.36% -8.22%    10.51  183.7 5.72% -11.06% -12.87% 1.81%     1       0         1 
06/16/2009 06/19/2009 Banro Corporation TSX:BAA 2.46 2.30 -6.69% 37.97 38.37 1.05% -7.74%    88.14  191.6 46.00% -65.48% -13.01% -52.47%     0       0         1 
05/26/2009 06/08/2009 Andina Minerals, Inc. TSXV:ADM 1.60 1.44 -9.84% 42.05 41.84 -0.50% -9.34%    12.01  161.0 7.46% -59.37% -9.45% -49.91%     0       0         1 
05/20/2009 05/28/2009 Aquiline Resources Inc. TSX:AQI 2.18 2.36 8.53% 38.43 40.47 5.31% 3.22%    14.57  549.0 2.65% -74.18% -21.12% -53.06%     0       0         1 
05/18/2009 06/23/2009 Apex Minerals NL ASX:AXM 0.19 0.15 -21.97% 37.65 37.49 -0.42% -21.55%    11.19  102.2 10.95% -74.77% -20.84% -53.94%     0       1         0 
05/15/2009 06/22/2009 Norseman Gold Plc. AIM:NGL 0.39 0.41 3.32% 38.05 37.65 -1.05% 4.38%      7.12  146.1 4.87% -32.37% -17.66% -14.71%     0       1         0 
05/14/2009 06/17/2009 Citigold Corporation Limited ASX:CTO 0.13 0.12 -6.15% 37.94 38.05 0.29% -6.44%      7.56  102.0 7.41% -53.94% -15.09% -38.86%     0       1         0 
05/06/2009 06/23/2009 Perseus Mining Ltd. ASX:PRU 0.65 0.64 -0.84% 34.78 36.86 5.97% -6.82%    13.34  519.6 2.57% -43.90% -23.04% -20.87%     0       0         0 
05/04/2009 05/20/2009 Keegan Resources Inc. TSX:KGN 2.22 2.15 -3.04% 33.04 35.03 6.02% -9.06%    14.71  226.0 6.51% -48.88% -25.08% -23.80%     0       0         1 
04/29/2009 05/12/2009 US Gold Corporation AMEX:UXG 2.09 2.02 -3.35% 33.11 33.89 2.36% -5.71%      44.0  286.4 15.36% 3.98% -22.15% 26.13%     0       0         0 
04/08/2009 04/21/2009 Aurizon Mines Ltd. TSX:ARZ 4.56 4.15 -9.13% 33.43 33.53 0.30% -9.43%    40.35  623.4 6.47% -4.27% -30.97% 26.71%     0       1         1 
02/24/2009 04/28/2009 Focus Minerals Limited ASX:FML 0.02 0.02 -10.19% 36.47 33.50 -8.14% -2.05%      2.12  173.2 1.22% -66.67% -28.40% -38.27%     0       1         0 
02/23/2009 03/10/2009 Rusoro Mining Ltd. TSXV:RML 0.56 0.56 0.77% 37.03 36.47 -1.51% 2.28%    78.12  221.9 35.21% -65.35% -27.30% -38.05%     0       1         1 
02/23/2009 03/05/2009 Great Basin Gold Ltd. AMEX:GBG 1.77 1.48 -16.38% 37.03 36.47 -1.51% -14.87%  100.83  600.8 16.78% -46.04% -27.30% -18.73%     1       1         1 
02/11/2009 02/19/2009 Exeter Resource Corporation TSX:XRC 2.24 2.31 3.02% 34.00 36.33 6.85% -3.83%    20.05  545.0 3.68% -47.35% -27.49% -19.86%     0       0         1 
12/02/2008 12/04/2008 Minefinders Corp. Ltd. TSX:MFL 3.62 3.20 -11.62% 22.50 24.69 9.73% -21.35%    31.73  680.4 4.66% -70.81% -51.94% -18.87%     1       0         1 
11/18/2008 01/02/2009 Resolute Mining Ltd. ASX:RSG 0.33 0.33 0.00% 19.66 19.56 -0.51% 0.51%      2.12  345.7 0.61% -79.37% -56.74% -22.62%     0       1         0 
11/10/2008 12/09/2008 Crew  Gold Corp. TSX:CRU 0.15 0.13 -16.96% 21.75 23.15 6.44% -23.40%    14.42  244.2 5.90% -90.69% -53.42% -37.27%     0       1         0 
10/31/2008 12/08/2008 Catalpa Resources Limited ASX:CAH 0.23 0.23 0.00% 21.70 20.95 -3.46% 3.46%        2.3  186.8 1.23% -80.40% -55.55% -24.84%     1       0         0 
09/03/2008 02/12/2009 Banro Corporation TSX:BAA 3.21 2.92 -9.17% 35.25 33.57 -4.77% -4.40%      14.0  191.6 7.31% -67.34% -8.82% -58.52%     0       0         0 
09/02/2008 09/11/2008 Banro Corporation TSX:BAA 3.47 3.21 -7.38% 37.64 35.25 -6.35% -1.03%    19.25  191.6 10.05% -64.74% -2.64% -62.10%     1       0         1 
Mean -3.23% 0.74% -3.97%
Median -2.91% 0.24% -3.31%  
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2. Firms (28 total, market cap in the $6.8 - $831.1 mm range as of transaction date) which have 
entered into private transactions (59 total, total transaction value in the $0.5 - $80.5 range) 
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03/16/2010 03/18/2010 Catalpa Resources Limited ASX:CAH 1.37 1.32 -3.84% 44.94 46.12 2.63% -6.46%    9.22  198.4 4.65% 48.85% 38.02% 10.83%      0        1        0 
03/01/2010 03/03/2010 Norton Gold Fields Limited ASX:NGF 0.16 0.16 0.00% 43.89 44.64 1.71% -1.71%  18.13    86.7 20.90% 16.67% 41.17% -24.50%      0        1        0 
02/18/2010 03/04/2010 OceanaGold Corporation ASX:OGC 2.20 2.19 -0.28% 44.71 45.06 0.78% -1.07%  21.49  408.6 5.26% 284.25% 19.64% 264.61%      0        1        0 
02/01/2010 02/25/2010 Rainy River Resources Ltd. TSXV:RR 4.73 4.84 2.25% 40.72 42.94 5.45% -3.20%  51.56  271.0 19.03% 213.66% 23.77% 189.89%      1        0        1 
01/19/2010 02/05/2010 CGA Mining Limited ASX:CGX 2.17 2.37 9.33% 47.42 47.69 0.57% 8.76%  80.45  622.1 12.93% 79.29% 53.56% 25.73%      0        1        1 
01/14/2010 01/14/2010 Carrick Gold Ltd. ASX:CRK 1.07 1.06 -0.47% 48.86 48.60 -0.53% 0.06%  16.76  129.6 12.93% 59.72% 73.26% -13.54%      0        0        0 
01/13/2010 02/04/2010 Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. TSX:KGI 7.98 8.46 5.97% 48.35 48.86 1.05% 4.92%  29.87  505.9 5.90% 123.82% 63.79% 60.03%      1        1        1 
12/14/2009 12/30/2009 Claude Resources, Inc. TSX:CRJ 1.29 1.21 -6.31% 47.82 48.47 1.35% -7.66%  13.08  152.7 8.56% 368.97% 57.61% 311.36%      1        1        1 
12/09/2009 12/22/2009 Brett Resources Inc. TSXV:BBR 1.65 1.68 1.63% 47.75 48.79 2.18% -0.55%    4.98  142.6 3.49% 234.62% 87.92% 146.70%      0        0        0 
11/10/2009 11/10/2009 Crocodile Gold Corp. TSX:CRK 1.28 1.13 -11.75% 49.28 49.66 0.78% -12.53%    0.51  175.1 0.29% 0.00% 112.87% -112.87%      1        0        0 
11/06/2009 12/22/2009 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 2.97 2.99 0.64% 46.72 47.62 1.93% -1.28%    2.97  269.2 1.10% 17.91% 113.04% -95.13%      0        0        0 
10/29/2009 11/24/2009 Victoria Gold Corp. TSXV:VIT 0.60 0.64 6.00% 41.87 43.80 4.61% 1.39%  14.15  117.7 12.02% 276.47% 100.72% 175.75%      1        0        1 
10/26/2009 11/10/2009 Perseus Mining Ltd. ASX:PRU 1.60 1.46 -8.64% 46.69 44.69 -4.28% -4.36%  54.22  486.0 11.16% 307.06% 185.22% 121.84%      0        1        1 
10/23/2009 11/16/2009 Claude Resources, Inc. TSX:CRJ 0.69 0.82 19.05% 46.99 46.69 -0.64% 19.69%    5.07    76.8 6.61% 152.63% 169.90% -17.27%      1        1        0 
10/21/2009 11/03/2009 Dynasty Metals & Mining Inc. TSX:DMM 4.16 4.04 -2.92% 47.50 47.39 -0.23% -2.69%      5.6  148.3 3.78% 248.44% 116.99% 131.45%      0        0        1 
10/19/2009 01/07/2010 Norton Gold Fields Limited ASX:NGF 0.29 0.34 19.09% 48.38 48.53 0.31% 18.78%  37.17  121.6 30.57% 162.50% 100.00% 62.50%      0        1        0 
10/15/2009 10/30/2009 Ventana Gold Corp. TSX:VEN 9.41 10.04 6.70% 49.13 48.16 -1.97% 8.68%  37.05  831.1 4.46% 0.00% 101.68% -101.68%      0        0        1 
10/12/2009 10/27/2009 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 3.03 3.09 1.93% 48.29 48.28 -0.02% 1.95%    0.94  271.6 0.35% 23.85% 80.19% -56.34%      0        0        0 
10/07/2009 11/02/2009 Rainy River Resources Ltd. TSXV:RR 2.18 2.12 -2.44% 47.60 47.90 0.63% -3.07%    7.68  122.2 6.29% 76.92% 73.85% 3.07%      0        0        1 
10/02/2009 10/14/2009 Silver Lake Resources Limited ASX:SLR 0.80 0.77 -4.15% 43.06 42.76 -0.70% -3.45%  16.73  124.3 13.46% 319.05% 48.74% 270.31%      0        1        0 
09/21/2009 10/30/2009 CGA Mining Limited ASX:CGX 1.79 1.73 -3.44% 45.92 45.15 -1.68% -1.76%  23.15  500.5 4.63% 60.94% 20.56% 40.38%      0        1        1 
09/01/2009 09/30/2009 Queenston Mining Inc. TSX:QMI 4.91 4.79 -2.39% 39.51 38.79 -1.82% -0.57%  15.83  282.7 5.60% 138.46% 12.09% 126.37%      1        0        1 
08/18/2009 09/10/2009 Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. TSX:KGI 8.02 7.97 -0.57% 37.30 37.87 1.53% -2.09%  34.32  469.5 7.31% 21.43% 6.24% 15.19%      1        1        1 
07/21/2009 07/27/2009 OceanaGold Corporation ASX:OGC 0.99 0.98 -1.46% 40.23 39.74 -1.22% -0.24%  19.93  159.4 12.50% 46.34% -17.38% 63.72%      1        1        0 
07/10/2009 08/26/2009 International Tow er Hill Mines Ltd TSX:ITH 2.87 2.57 -10.62% 35.31 35.14 -0.48% -10.14%    2.97  139.1 2.14% 104.55% -24.34% 128.89%      0        0        0 
06/29/2009 08/06/2009 Victoria Gold Corp. TSXV:VIT 0.36 0.34 -5.26% 39.20 39.15 -0.13% -5.14%    1.77    51.8 3.42% -40.71% -19.32% -21.39%      0        0        1 
06/26/2009 07/13/2009 Apollo Gold Corp. TSX:APG 0.43 0.43 -0.40% 39.99 39.20 -1.98% 1.58%  11.22    99.9 11.23% -13.16% -13.85% 0.69%      0        1        1 
05/26/2009 06/12/2009 CGA Mining Limited ASX:CGX 1.37 1.30 -5.16% 42.05 41.84 -0.50% -4.66%  17.91  361.8 4.95% -5.91% -9.45% 3.54%      0        1        1 
05/18/2009 05/22/2009 Apex Minerals NL ASX:AXM 0.20 0.15 -25.90% 37.65 37.49 -0.42% -25.48%  10.91    90.9 12.00% -68.75% -20.84% -47.91%      0        1        0 
05/06/2009 06/17/2009 Perseus Mining Ltd. ASX:PRU 0.70 0.64 -7.97% 34.78 36.86 5.97% -13.95%  46.05  143.5 32.09% -27.87% -23.04% -4.83%      0        1        1 
05/05/2009 05/29/2009 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 2.98 2.97 -0.33% 35.03 34.78 -0.71% 0.38%    0.91  286.3 0.32% -31.31% -20.57% -10.74%      0        0        0 
04/10/2009 04/15/2009 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 4.06 3.40 -16.21% 33.04 33.77 2.21% -18.42%    1.24  362.2 0.34% -16.24% -32.61% 16.37%      0        0        0 
03/31/2009 05/12/2009 Catalpa Resources Limited ASX:CAH 0.62 0.62 -0.85% 36.40 36.88 1.32% -2.17%  24.05    32.3 74.50% 37.29% -23.69% 60.98%      0        1        1 
03/30/2009 04/30/2009 Ventana Gold Corp. TSX:VEN 1.26 1.25 -0.76% 37.00 36.40 -1.62% 0.86%    5.06    94.9 5.33% 0.00% -22.43% 22.43%      1        0        0 
03/24/2009 03/24/2009 Ramelius Resources Ltd. ASX:RMS 0.41 0.44 7.21% 37.71 36.86 -2.25% 9.47%    9.42    75.6 12.46% -38.95% -19.71% -19.24%      0        1        0 
03/03/2009 03/03/2009 Norseman Gold Plc. AIM:NGL 0.14 0.12 -15.31% 31.09 31.68 1.90% -17.21%    7.02    11.7 60.15% -75.52% -43.08% -32.44%      0        1        0 
02/26/2009 03/05/2009 Medusa Mining Ltd. ASX:MML 0.87 0.83 -5.05% 32.90 33.50 1.82% -6.88%  15.67  127.0 12.34% 0.74% -38.11% 38.85%      0        1        0 
02/24/2009 04/06/2009 Focus Minerals Limited ASX:FML 0.02 0.02 -10.19% 36.47 33.50 -8.14% -2.05%  17.76    23.9 74.31% -51.79% -28.40% -23.39%      0        1        0 
02/24/2009 02/24/2009 Allied Gold Ltd. ASX:ALD 0.33 0.32 -3.99% 36.47 33.50 -8.14% 4.15%  19.89  136.6 14.56% -25.90% -28.40% 2.50%      0        1        0 
02/20/2009 03/04/2009 Queenston Mining Inc. TSX:QMI 3.08 3.04 -1.27% 35.64 37.03 3.90% -5.17%  14.07  162.1 8.68% 12.57% -29.83% 42.40%      1        0        1 
02/19/2009 03/16/2009 Victoria Gold Corp. TSXV:VIT 0.41 0.37 -11.38% 37.37 35.64 -4.63% -6.75%    8.01    54.9 14.58% -53.57% -26.65% -26.92%      1        0        1 
02/12/2009 03/11/2009 Ventana Gold Corp. TSX:VEN 0.50 0.68 36.69% 49.13 48.16 -1.97% 38.66%    2.61    33.1 7.89% 0.00% 2.87% -2.87%      1        0        0 
02/12/2009 03/03/2009 Romarco Minerals Inc. TSXV:R 0.29 0.28 -3.22% 36.33 36.48 0.41% -3.63%  21.17    58.9 35.97% 123.53% -23.93% 147.46%      1        0        1 
02/12/2009 03/04/2009 International Tow er Hill Mines Ltd TSX:ITH 2.31 2.37 2.41% 36.33 36.48 0.41% 2.00%    8.21  102.2 8.03% 37.21% -23.93% 61.14%      1        0        0 
02/10/2009 02/19/2009 Banro Corporation TSX:BAA 1.52 1.53 0.78% 34.37 34.00 -1.08% 1.85%    14.0    79.8 17.55% -80.27% -29.35% -50.92%      0        0        0 
02/03/2009 03/05/2009 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 3.75 3.89 3.73% 32.90 33.36 1.40% 2.33%    0.78  320.5 0.24% -19.83% -31.67% 11.84%      0        0        0 
02/02/2009 02/17/2009 Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. TSX:KGI 4.32 4.14 -4.27% 34.23 32.90 -3.89% -0.39%  10.84  240.6 4.51% -46.73% -28.91% -17.82%      1        1        1 
01/30/2009 02/19/2009 Dynasty Metals & Mining Inc. TSX:DMM 3.39 3.35 -1.10% 34.40 34.23 -0.49% -0.61%    7.96  111.5 7.14% -45.73% -31.68% -14.05%      1        0        0 
01/27/2009 02/26/2009 Luna Gold Corp. TSXV:LGC 0.13 0.13 -0.64% 33.97 33.47 -1.47% 0.83%  24.92    10.8 230.10% -87.40% -33.67% -53.73%      0        0        0 
01/27/2009 03/11/2009 Apex Minerals NL ASX:AXM 0.25 0.25 0.00% 33.97 33.47 -1.47% 1.47%    12.7    96.2 13.20% -63.46% -33.67% -29.79%      0        1        0 
01/27/2009 02/10/2009 CGA Mining Limited ASX:CGX 0.94 0.94 0.00% 33.97 33.47 -1.47% 1.47%  20.37  224.7 9.06% 2.86% -33.67% 36.53%      0        1        1 
01/21/2009 01/28/2009 Perseus Mining Ltd. ASX:PRU 0.37 0.34 -6.48% 30.88 31.65 2.49% -8.98%      5.7    64.7 8.81% -36.78% -37.62% 0.84%      0        1        0 
12/01/2008 12/18/2008 Victoria Gold Corp. TSXV:VIT 0.17 0.17 -1.92% 26.57 22.50 -15.32% 13.40%    3.57    16.8 21.20% -70.55% -43.25% -27.30%      1        0        1 
10/31/2008 11/17/2008 Luna Gold Corp. TSXV:LGC 0.11 0.10 -10.31% 21.70 20.95 -3.46% -6.85%      2.0      6.8 29.28% -84.66% -55.55% -29.11%      1        0        0 
10/29/2008 12/09/2008 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 1.93 2.36 21.99% 18.69 20.86 11.61% 10.38%    1.57  174.8 0.90% -56.97% -61.72% 4.75%      0        0        0 
10/01/2008 10/10/2008 Tanzanian Royalty Exploration TSX:TNX 2.69 2.62 -2.41% 33.79 33.77 -0.06% -2.35%    0.84  210.6 0.40% -48.74% -22.85% -25.89%      0        0        0 
09/29/2008 09/30/2008 Apex Minerals NL ASX:AXM 0.33 0.34 2.47% 35.83 34.00 -5.11% 7.58%  46.19  127.9 36.11% -62.44% -7.32% -55.12%      1        1        0 
08/06/2008 08/21/2008 Apollo Gold Corp. TSX:APG 0.40 0.39 -2.85% 38.59 39.21 1.61% -4.45%    8.12    81.2 10.00% -7.69% 0.03% -7.72%      0        1        1 
08/05/2008 08/07/2008 Allied Gold Ltd. ASX:ALD 0.28 0.30 7.83% 40.85 38.59 -5.53% 13.36%    9.58  106.2 9.02% -31.61% 5.45% -37.06%      0        1        0 
Mean -0.68% -0.45% -0.23% 22.62%  
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IV. RESULTS 
According to Rudenno (2009), “on a day-to-day basis such issues as commodity prices 
and exploration announcements will influence price movements” (p. 283). As this is a compelling 
argument both from the theoretical and the practical viewpoints: a) ARCA:GDX index is used for 
benchmarking to control for fluctuations in the price of gold companies; b) firms with exploration 
announcements on the date of equity issuance announcement are not included in the sample.  
 
Public Transactions 
When examining public transactions over the specified time period, we observe an 
average drop of 3.23% in the share price of the issuer; when we benchmark share price movement 
against the ARCA:GDX movement on the same date, this drop is negative 3.97%. The 
considerable range of benchmarked share price movement of between negative 33.78% and 
positive 21.32% suggests that the fact of issuance in itself is not a predictor of how the share price 
will react and that other factors need to be examined for correlation with share price fluctuation. 
    The null hypothesis posits that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the change in share price upon equity issuance announcement and such factors as dilution 
percentage (defined as Total Transaction Volume/Market Cap on day of Transaction), prior stock 
performance (defined as LTM returns over benchmark, ARCA:GDX), warrant issuance (Y/N), 
presence or absence of producing facilities (Y/N) and underwriters’ domicile (Canada/Other). 
Multiple regression method was used to test this hypothesis.    
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Regression Analysis: Relative SP Change versus Dilution  
The regression equation is 
Relative SP Change = - 0.0115 - 0.204 Dilution 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant   -0.01149  0.01852  -0.62  0.539 
Dilution   -0.20431  0.08652  -2.36  0.023 
S = 0.0917208   R-Sq = 12.2%   R-Sq(adj) = 10.0% 
Analysis of Variance 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.046914  0.046914  5.58  0.023 
Residual Error  40  0.336508  0.008413 
Total           41  0.383422 
 
Unusual Observations 
                Relative 
Obs  Dilution  SP Change      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
 10     0.087     0.1631  -0.0293  0.0148    0.1924      2.13R 
 15     0.197     0.2132  -0.0517  0.0150    0.2650      2.93R 
 16     0.959    -0.3378  -0.2074  0.0724   -0.1305     -2.32RX 
 26     0.109    -0.2155  -0.0339  0.0144   -0.1816     -2.00R 
 37     0.047    -0.2135  -0.0210  0.0162   -0.1925     -2.13R 
 39     0.059    -0.2340  -0.0236  0.0157   -0.2104     -2.33R 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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T statistic value in this regression indicates that there is a significant negative correlation 
between shareholder base dilution precipitated by the transaction and the post-announcement 
adjusted share price movement; the coefficient suggests that for each percentage point in 
shareholder base dilution there is a 0.2 percentage point drop in share price (adjusted for 
corresponding index movement). This inverse relationship is what we would reasonably expect 
from the point of view of a shareholder whose holdings in the company get diluted. However, the 
adjusted R-sq of 10.0% implies that only 10% of the share price movement is explained by the 
dilution, with 90% attributable to other factors.       
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Regression Analysis: Relative SP Change versus Dilution, Excess LTM SP Return  
The regression equation is 
Relative SP Change = - 0.0254 - 0.188 Dilution + 0.0101 Excess LTM SP Return 
 
Predictor                 Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant              -0.02544   0.01931  -1.32  0.195 
Dilution              -0.18833   0.08409  -2.24  0.031 
Excess LTM SP Return  0.010141  0.005229   1.94  0.060 
 
S = 0.0887107   R-Sq = 20.0%   R-Sq(adj) = 15.8% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       2  0.076507  0.038254  4.86  0.013 
Residual Error  39  0.306914  0.007870 
Total           41  0.383422 
Source                DF    Seq SS 
Dilution               1  0.046914 
Excess LTM SP Return   1  0.029594 
Unusual Observations 
                Relative 
Obs  Dilution  SP Change      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  7     0.108    -0.1156   0.0695  0.0549   -0.1851     -2.66RX 
 15     0.197     0.2132  -0.0332  0.0174    0.2464      2.83R 
 16     0.959    -0.3378  -0.2157  0.0702   -0.1221     -2.25RX 
 37     0.047    -0.2135  -0.0361  0.0175   -0.1774     -2.04R 
 39     0.059    -0.2340  -0.0403  0.0175   -0.1936     -2.23R 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
T statistic values in this regression indicates that–while there is a significant negative 
correlation between shareholder base dilution precipitated by the transaction and the post-
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announcement adjusted share price movement–the correlation between share price movement and 
historical stock performance fails to clear the standard of significance: t statistic of 1.94 (<2.0). 
An examination of the relationship between Relative SP Change and Excess LTM Return 
suggests that it may not be linear, as illustrated by the graph below, which further corroborates the 
lack of statistical significance of the latter independent variable.   
 
 
 
 
Regression Analysis: Relative SP Change versus Dilution, Excess LTM SP Return, 
Warrants  
The regression equation is 
Relative SP Change = - 0.0182 - 0.171 Dilution + 0.00872 Excess LTM SP Return 
                     - 0.0424 Warrants 
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 Predictor                 Coef   SE Coef      T      P 
Constant              -0.01815   0.02021  -0.90  0.375 
Dilution              -0.17070   0.08505  -2.01  0.052 
Excess LTM SP Return  0.008721  0.005346   1.63  0.111 
Warrants              -0.04241   0.03633  -1.17  0.250 
 
S = 0.0883013   R-Sq = 22.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 16.6% 
Analysis of Variance 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       3  0.087131  0.029044  3.72  0.019 
Residual Error  38  0.296291  0.007797 
Total           41  0.383422 
 
Source                DF    Seq SS 
Dilution               1  0.046914 
Excess LTM SP Return   1  0.029594 
Warrants               1  0.010624 
 
Unusual Observations 
                Relative 
Obs  Dilution  SP Change      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  7     0.108    -0.1156   0.0626  0.0550   -0.1782     -2.58RX 
 15     0.197     0.2132  -0.0265  0.0182    0.2398      2.78R 
 16     0.959    -0.3378  -0.2326  0.0713   -0.1052     -2.02RX 
 26     0.109    -0.2155  -0.0415  0.0186   -0.1739     -2.01R 
 39     0.059    -0.2340  -0.0315  0.0190   -0.2025     -2.35R 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
T statistic values in this regression indicates that while there is a significant negative 
correlation between shareholder base dilution precipitated by the transaction and the post-
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announcement adjusted share price movement, the factor of presence of warrants fails to clear the 
standard of significance, with a t statistic of -1.17 (<2.0). 
The three regressions above pass the multicollinearity test as we observe 
1. No significant change in regression coefficients as independent variables are added or 
removed 
2. T-statistics in line with F-scores 
In summary, although adding independent variables such as prior stock performance and 
presence of warrants increases the R-sq of our regression, these independent variables do not have 
a statistically significant relationship with benchmarked share price performance on the day of 
announcement as indicated by the respective t statistic values. Although the t statistic value was 
significant for dilution as an independent variable, the R-sq of 10.0% does not allow us to reject 
the H0 that there is no statistically significant relationship between share price performance on 
announcement date and any of the three predictors examined above.      
It is also important to note that the following potential predictors of share price 
performance on announcement date were examined 
‐ Producing v Non-Producing firms (using respective dummy variables of 1 and 0)  
‐ Canadian v Non-Canadian underwriters (using respective dummy variables of 1 and 0) 
No correlation between Excess LTM Return as Independent Variable and Relative SP 
Change as dependent variable was found as indicated by individual respective regressions 
yielding R-sq values of 0.0% and 0.0%. Thus, H0 hypotheses cannot be rejected for any of these 
factors.   
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Private Transactions 
When examining private transactions over the specified time period, we observe an 
average drop of 0.68% in the share price of the issuer; when we benchmark share price movement 
against the ARCA:GDX movement on the same date, this drop is 0.23%. The considerable range 
of benchmarked share price movement of negative 25.48% to positive 38.66% suggests that the 
fact of issuance in itself is not a predictor of how the share price will react and that other factors 
need to be examined for correlation with share price fluctuation. 
    The null hypothesis posits that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the change in share price upon equity issuance announcement and such factors as dilution 
percentage, prior stock performance, warrant issuance, presence or absence of producing facilities 
and underwriters’ domicile. Multiple regression method was used to test this. When each one of 
the proposed predictors was examined against the dependent variable (share price change) 
individually, R-sq of 0.0% was obtained in each case. This led to the conclusion that H0 for 
private issuances cannot be rejected based on the data set at hand. 
The examination of the relationship between share price change on private issuance and 
dilution is enclosed below for illustrative purposes. 
Regression Analysis: Relative SP Change versus Dilution  
The regression equation is 
Relative SP Change = - 0.0028 - 0.0073 Dilution 
 
Predictor      Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant   -0.00282  0.01423  -0.20  0.844 
Dilution   -0.00728  0.03920  -0.19  0.853 
 
S = 0.0965167   R-Sq = 0.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 
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Analysis of Variance 
Source          DF        SS        MS     F      P 
Regression       1  0.000321  0.000321  0.03  0.853 
Residual Error  57  0.530982  0.009315 
Total           58  0.531304 
 
Unusual Observations 
                Relative 
Obs  Dilution  SP Change      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
 14      0.07     0.1969  -0.0033  0.0132    0.2002      2.09R 
 16      0.31     0.1878  -0.0050  0.0136    0.1929      2.02R 
 29      0.12    -0.2548  -0.0037  0.0127   -0.2511     -2.62R 
 44      0.08     0.3866  -0.0034  0.0131    0.3900      4.08R 
 51      2.30     0.0083  -0.0196  0.0844    0.0279      0.60 X 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Below are some of the main factors which may explain why the hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between changes in share price of junior gold mining 
companies upon follow-on equity issuance in recessionary and post-recessionary economic 
environment of 2008-2010 and projected company- / issuance-specific features could not be 
rejected. When considered specifically within the context of current economic situation, some of 
these issues may have a negative effect, while some – positive, especially when applied to 
individual companies. We posit that such dichotomy is the main reason for absence of an 
observable, statistically significant relationship. One other factor which impeded finding a 
statistically significant relationship is the sheer sample size, as there were mere 42 public and 59 
private transactions in the time period examined.    
 
Factors which may depress share price   
Dilution. This is the most obvious, defensible and oft-quoted reason for a drop in share 
price upon a follow-on offering. Junior gold companies are no exception. According To Haywood 
Mining Team (2008), with “access to capital constrained by the global credit crisis…those 
companies successful in raising new equity expect this to be achieved at the expense of significant 
dilution” (p. 2). This ‘outsized’ dilution not only produces negative share price movements in line 
with expectations directionally, but also exacerbates their magnitude in comparison to what would 
be anticipated in a stable economic environment. 
Change in risk profile assessment due to financing risks. In the recessionary and post-
recessionary environment, investors are re-evaluating the risk profile of junior gold miners in 
their portfolios–and demanding a larger return for that risk. The resulting greater discount rate 
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decreases the present value of future cash flows, and precipitates a decrease in share price when 
the number of claims (i.e., shares outstanding) on those cash flows goes up after an offering. 
Change in risk profile assessment due to technical and political risks. Due to the 
gradual decrease in effectiveness of exploration discussed below, companies are increasingly 
pursuing opportunities that entail higher technical and political risk options (McKeith, 2009, p. 
14). As a result, while an injection of cash may facilitate development and eventual production, 
cash flows from such production are discounted at a higher rate, bringing down total firm value. 
Realignment of NAV. NAV multiples have been reset to the 0.8x – 1.0x range by 
analysts (Haywood, 2008, p.4) as a result of the financing uncertainty and the increased risk of 
continuous financing across the industry at large. Consequently, new investors are getting a better 
value proposition than existing investors, leading to greater dilution for the latter. 
Equity Issuance Assumptions. Exacerbating prior issue, according to Haywood Mining 
Team (2008), “companies [raise] project financing at prices significantly lower below project 
NAV” (p.4). Thus, as ‘average’ NAV across all security holders drops, and so does share price.  
Reduced Effectiveness of Exploration Throughout the Industry. In his report, 
McKeith (2009) points out the decreasing long-term effectiveness of gold exploration globally. 
This is indicated by the metric of the ratio of in-situ value of gold found per exploration dollar 
spent: according to GFL/MinEx Consulting, for the 2000-2009 decade, this ratio was 11x (i.e., 
$11 worth of gold discovered for every $1 spent on exploration), compared to 23x, 57x, 83x, 
105x and 42x times respectively for 1990-1999, 1980-1989, 1970-1979, 1960-1969 and 1950-
1959. (p. 12). If this trend continues, investors should now and may very well in the future expect 
an increasingly lower return on each dollar they invest into exploration. 
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Factors which may boost share price 
While it was found that on average  (albeit with no statistical significance) a follow-on 
equity offering will decrease the share price of a junior gold mining company, it is easily 
observable in the sample that some individual firms do, in fact, get a boost to their share price as a 
result. This phenomenon can have the following explanations 
Moving closer to development. The cash received in the follow-on equity transaction 
could provide pivotal in getting to the next stage of the company cycle. The broad market may be 
aware of that in specific situations based on prior management reports, and private investors–even 
more so based on pre-existing relationships with companies. 
Signaling of a steady source of financing. A one-off transaction, while precipitating an 
immediate dilution effect–particularly when new shares are issued at a lower NAV multiple 
valuation than existing shares–could also be a signal of more cash injections to come in the future.  
Acquisition arbitrage. McKeith (2009) notes that “Major-Junior partnerships [are a 
factor]–perhaps some of the investment is speculation on prospective acquisition by majors” (p. 
18). While the equity issuance in itself is no way an indication of such upcoming acquisition or 
partnership, perhaps new investors informed of such event in the future accept a short-term 
flogging on dilution in expectation of future outsized gains.   
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VI. ISSUES OUTSTANDING / NEXT STEPS  
Both industry literature and anecdotal evidence from insiders strongly point at the quality 
of a junior gold mining company management as one single issue pivotal to its valuation. Dr. 
Rudenno, in his seminal work “The Mining Valuation Handbook”, mentions that the three most 
important issues to a gold mining company value are 1) Earnings Growth ; 2) Increasing Cash 
Flow [from Operations];  and 3) Exploration Success. Further, he posits that “management should 
have a track record of exploration success” in order to for the company to realize favorable future 
outcome of investment in the development of proven reserves. While it proved challenging to 
express “quality of management” in quantitative terms–and thus to apply this theory when 
evaluating a large group of junior gold miners using statistical tools – in this study, it is 
imperative to take a qualitative look at management quality when examining individual 
explorers’/mid-tiers producers’ value proposition.      
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1. INTRODUCTION 
From 2004 to early 2007, the financial markets had been very calm. The market volatility, as 
measured by the S&P 500 volatility and the VIX index, have been below long-term averages. 
However, the financial crisis of 2008 changed this: most asset classes experienced significant 
pullbacks, the correlation between asset classes increased significantly and the markets have 
become extremely volatile. During this time, the S&P 500 lost about 56% of its value from the 
October 2007 peak to the March 2009 trough and the VIX Index more than tripled, highlighting 
the leverage effect that Black (1976) described in his paper on the study of stock market 
volatility.  
 
Figure 1: Daily closing levels of the S&P 500 Index (SPX) and the S&P 500 Volatility Index 
(VIX). The sample period is January 3, 2005 – December 11, 2009. Source: CBOE and Yahoo 
Finance 
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While the industry and academia have done extensive work on the stock market volatility 
and the negative relationship between stock returns and volatility over the years, we did not find 
any literature examining these subjects during the recent financial crisis. In this report, we study 
the stock market volatility and the behavior of various measures of volatility before, during and 
after the 2008 financial crisis, and whether the leverage effect was observed during this period. 
To explore the stock market volatility and different measures of volatility, we analyzed the 
volatility of S&P 500 returns, the VIX Index, VIX Futures, VXV Index, and S&P 500 Implied 
Volatility Skew. We also analyzed the implied volatility of Options on VIX Futures to study the 
behavior of “volatility of volatility” during the financial crisis. To study the leverage effect, we 
analyzed the relationship between S&P 500 returns, VIX Index and VIX Futures. 
1.1 VIX Index  
Since its introduction in 1993, VIX – the CBOE Volatility Index – became the 
benchmark for stock market volatility and is followed feverishly by both option traders and 
equity market participants. VIX measures the market’s expectations of 30-day volatility, as 
conveyed by the market option prices. While the original VIX used options on the S&P 100 
index, the updated VIX uses put and call options on the S&P 500 index. The new methodology 
estimates expected S&P 500 Index (SPX) volatility by averaging the weighted prices of SPX 
puts and calls over the entire range of strike prices. The components of VIX are near- and next-
term put and call options, always in the first and second SPX contract months. 
VIX has been dubbed as the “Fear Index” because it spikes during market turmoil or 
periods of extreme uncertainty. VIX reached its highest level ever during the major stock market 
decline in October 1987. Additionally, it has been shown that it is negatively correlated with the 
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S&P 500 index – it rises when the index falls and vice versa. 
1.2 VIX Futures 
While the VIX index has a strong negative relationship with the S&P 500 Index, VIX is 
not a tradable asset. Hence, one cannot use the VIX index to protect against market declines. 
However, futures contracts on the VIX Index are available and market participants can use them 
as a hedging instrument. Unlike S&P 500, the futures contracts on VIX have an expiration date. 
The value of a particular VIX Futures contract corresponds to the markets expectation of the 
VIX Index value as of the expiration date of the contract. Since the maturity of the VIX Futures 
contract decreases every day, we decided to construct a VIX Futures contract with constant 30 
day maturity for the purpose of this study. The fixed maturity VIX futures prices are constructed 
by using the market data of available contracts with linear interpolation technique. 
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Figure 2: VIX Futures monthly open interest and volume. Plot shows increase in monthly 
volume and open interest of VIX Futures contracts since their introduction. The sample period is 
March 2005 – November 2009. Source: CBOE 
1.3 VXV Index 
While VIX is a measure of expected 30 days volatility of the S&P 500 Index, VXV 
measures the expected 3 month S&P 500 Index volatility. Conceptually, one can think of VIX as 
an indicator of near term event risk, because it captures the volatility that is associated with 
events that are expected to occur in the next 30 days. Using VIX and VXV indexes together, one 
can get good insight into the term structure of S&P 500 Index (SPX) options implied volatility.  
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Figure 3: Daily closing values of VIX and VXV indexes. Plot shows strong correlation between 
the VIX and VXV Indexes. Additionally, the difference between VIX and VXV indexes was the 
highest just after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. The sample period is 
December 4, 2007 – December 31, 2009. Source: CBOE 
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1.4 Implied Volatility Skew of S&P 500 Index Options 
Several market participants use index options to either protect their investments or 
express their market views. Black-Scholes-Merton Model (BSM) is the industry standard for 
pricing equity and foreign exchange options. For a given stock or index, BSM assumes that the 
implied volatility is the same across option strike prices. However, several studies have shown 
that market prices for options do not reflect this constant volatility assumption and instead show 
a skew. Figures 4a and 4b show the S&P 500 Implied volatility skew and surface plots. Market 
participants define volatility skew in different ways; for the purpose of this report, we define it as 
the difference in implied volatilities of 30 days maturity S&P 500 Index options that are 90% 
moneyness and 110% moneyness. Moneyness is defined as: 
% moneyness  = Strike Price / Spot Price 
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 Figure 4a: S&P 500 Implied Volatility Skew on 11/30/2009. The skew referes to the pattern 
where the implied volatility of in-the-money options is higher than the implied volatility of at-
the-money options. Source: Bloomberg 
 
Figure 4b: S&P 500 Implied Volatility Surface on 11/30/2009. The implied volatility surface is 
a plot of implied volatility as a function of both strike price and time to maturity. It can also be 
described as a plot of volatility skews with different time to maturity. Source: Bloomberg 
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 1.5 Implied Volatility of the Options on VIX  
Since the introduction of options on VIX in 2006, VIX options have become very popular 
with investors trying to express their views on market volatility. VIX options are European style 
options and can only be exercised on the expiration date of the contract. The valuation of VIX 
options uses the expected, or forward, value of VIX on the expiration date and not the spot value 
of the VIX Index. Further, VIX options are priced differently from Stock or Index options. Stock 
or Index option pricing models assume that the underlying asset is lognormally distributed, 
whereas, VIX is not lognormal (in a lognormal world, the asset price can go to zero, but VIX 
cannot go to zero because it would mean that there is no volatility in S&P 500 Index). Another 
distinct feature of VIX options is very high implied volatility (i.e., very high volatility of 
volatility). Volatility of volatility, as defined here, is a measure of the volatility of the VIX 
forward values. Put another way, this is a measure of how volatile markets views are about 
expected 30 day S&P 500 volatility on the expiration date of the contract. 
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 Figure 5: Monthly trading volumes for Put and Call Options on VIX. Total volume is the sum of 
put and call volumes. The increasing trading volume highlights the growing popularity of VIX 
Options. The sample period is February 2006 – November 2009. Source: CBOE  
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II. PREVIOUS WORK 
Brenner and Galai (1989) first introduced the concept of volatility derivatives and the 
need for a volatility index. Moran and Dash (2007) demonstrated that VIX Futures contracts 
have a negative correlation to the S&P 500 returns and how they could be used in a hedging 
portfolio to improve the efficiency of investor portfolios. Further, they tested the behavior of the 
VIX Futures contracts during periods of high market volatility to demonstrate that the beneficial 
qualities of VIX exposure can be obtained through the use of VIX-linked Futures and Options 
contracts. Zhang, Shu and Brenner (2010) analyzed recent data to establish a theoretical 
relationship between VIX Futures and VIX and suggested a model that gives good VIX Futures  
prices under normal market conditions which could be used in pricing VIX Options. 
Despite the popularity of the Black-Scholes model for pricing options, many researchers 
have shown that the model’s constant volatility assumption across different strikes is inconsistent 
with market prices. It has been shown that the implied volatilities generally increase as the strike 
price decreases (Poon and Granger 2003). A popular explanation for the existence of volatility 
skew relate to the Leverage Effect. The Leverage Effect theory posits that as the stock index 
value decreases, the leverage of the market increases, which makes the equity more risky. Thus, 
the implied volatility increases for the lower strike prices.  
Extensive research has been done on the leverage effect in the stock market returns since 
this phenomenon was first described by Black (1976). Whaley (2000) demonstrated the negative 
correlation between the S&P 500 returns and changes in the VIX Index. He showed that this 
negative relationship between S&P 500 returns and change in VIX is asymmetric – the index 
falls more when the VIX increases but it doesn’t rise by as much when VIX falls. According to 
96
 
 
Whaley (2000), the S&P index falls by 0.707% for a 100 bps increase in VIX and the S&P 500 
index rises by 0.469% for a 100 bps drop in VIX. 
 
III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
For the purpose of our analysis, we reviewed daily data from January 2005 – November 
2009. We divided this period into three distinct sub-periods called Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-
Crisis. While there are different opinions about the exact date of the onset of the financial crisis, 
we have used March 17th 2008, the date on which US Investment Bank Bear Stearns & Co was 
taken over by JP Morgan, as the cutoff for our Pre-Crisis/Crisis periods. While it is difficult to 
exactly pinpoint when the crisis ended, we picked March 31st 2009 as the end date for the crisis 
because the S&P 500 index rebounded well from its lowest value by the end of March. Table 1 
shows our assumptions regarding the study period dates.  
Table 1: Classification of Study Period 
     
Period Start Date End Date  
Pre-Crisis 3-Jan-05 16-Mar-08 
Crisis 17-Mar-08 31-Mar-09 
Post-Crisis 1-Apr-09 30-Nov-09 
 
While the dates for the Crisis and Post-Crisis periods are consistent throughout the report, 
the start date for the Pre-Crisis period is different for different measures of volatility due to data 
availability. We have provided this information along with the exhibits in this report. Table 2 
shows the sources of data used in the analysis followed by a brief description of the data.  
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Table 2: Data sources   
      
Data Description Data Source Website Link 
S&P 500: Adjusted 
Close Values Yahoo Finance  http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=SPX 
VIX: Daily Closing 
Values 
Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/historical.aspx
VXV: Daily Closing 
Values 
Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) http://www.cboe.com/micro/vxv/ 
VIX Futures: Daily 
Settle Values 
CBOE Futures Exchange 
(CFE) http://cfe.cboe.com/Products/historicalVIX.aspx 
S&P 500: Implied 
Volatility Data Bloomberg  
VIX Options: Call 
Options Prices 
CBOE Market Data 
Express Service http://www.marketdataexpress.com/ 
 
S&P 500 Index Data: We used the adjusted daily closing values of the SPX index as they 
incorporate the dividend yield. We assumed that the SPX daily returns are lognormal and used 
the percentage daily returns in estimating the negative correlation between index returns and 
volatility.  
VIX and VXV Indexes: We used the daily closing values for both the indexes. VXV data is 
available from December 4, 2007 onwards. Thus, we used the data from the period December 
2007 – December 2009 when analyzing VIX versus VXV. 
 VIX Futures: We considered using the daily “settle” values for the various VIX Futures 
contracts that were traded each day. However, the maturities of these contracts were not fixed 
and would decrease every day. So, we created a constant 30-day maturity VIX Futures contract 
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through linear interpolation of available VIX Futures contracts with varying maturities.  
S&P 500 Implied Volatility Skew Data: We obtained the implied volatilities of S&P 500 Index 
options that are 90% money, 100% money and 110% money from Bloomberg. We then obtained 
the volatility skew as the difference in implied volatilities of options at 90% money and 110% 
money. Appendix A provides details of the methodology that Bloomberg uses to estimate the 
implied volatilities for 30 days maturity options at a particular level of moneyness. 
Implied Volatility of VIX Options (volatility of volatility): To study the volatility of volatility, 
we estimated the volatility implied by the VIX Options prices. Since there are no standard VIX 
Options pricing models, we decided to use the Black model for futures as a reasonable solution. 
For each trading date, we first mapped the available call option contracts to VIX Futures 
contracts such that the VIX Futures maturity is later than the options expiry date. For all VIX 
Futures contracts that satisfied this condition, we picked the one with the earliest maturity as the 
underlying for the VIX Options contract. Next, we picked option strike prices that straddle the 
VIX Futures closing values. Using the VIX Futures value as the price of the underlying, 1-month 
T-Bill rates as the riskless rate, the difference between the option expiry date and the current 
trading date as time to expiry, and option strikes and option prices from the selected call option 
contracts, we estimated the implied volatility of the VIX options. 
We also estimated the volatility of VIX Index and the computed 30-day VIX Futures by 
calculating the standard deviation of percentage daily changes in their respective values. 
99
 
 
IV. RESULTS and DISCUSSION 
IV.1. Behavior of Stock market volatility and different measures of volatility 
Table 3 below provides a summary of the stock market behavior, as measured by the 
S&P 500, during the study period. The results clearly show that the volatility of the index returns 
was significantly higher during the Crisis period compared to other periods.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics for S&P 500 Index Performance 
    
Period 
S&P 500 Index 
Average Value 
Annualized Volatility of S&P 
500 Index Returns2  
Pre-Crisis 1,335  13.4%  
Crisis 1,098  43.6%  
Post-Crisis 984  20.9%  
All Data1 1,233  24.2%  
    
1. 'All Data' corresponds to the time period January 2005 - November 2009 
2. Annualized volatility is estimated by multiplying the standard deviation of daily 
returns by sqrt(250) 
 
It is interesting to note that the average value of the S&P 500 index was higher during the 
Crisis period than that during the Post-Crisis period. However, this could be due to our selection 
of the dates for each period. If one were to analyze the performance of the SPX index from the 
time of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 to the market bottom in March 
2009, the core of the crisis, the average value of the index is 884, which is lower than the average 
value during the Post-Crisis period. Similarly, the annualized volatility of the SPX returns during 
the September 2008 – March 2009 period, the core of the crisis, is 56.9%. This confirms that the 
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market volatility was significantly higher during the crisis period compared to other periods. 
Tables 4a and 4b provides a summary of different volatility measures that we analyzed.  
Table 4a: Performance Summary of Volatility Measures – Average Values 
    
Period VIX Average VIX Futures Average2 VXV Average 
Pre-Crisis 24.76 25.28 24.87 
Crisis 36.85 34.70 35.39 
Post-Crisis 30.70 29.80 32.93 
All Data1 32.16 31.74 32.03 
    
1. 'All Data' corresponds to the period December 4, 2007 - November 30, 2009 
2. Refers to the 30 days constant maturity VIX Futures Index that we constructed 
 
Table 4b: Performance Summary of Volatility Measures - Annualized 
Volatility of % Daily Changes1 
    
Period VIX VIX Futures2 VXV 
Pre-Crisis 96% 47% 64% 
Crisis 128% 71% 86% 
Post-Crisis 83% 48% 50% 
All Data3 107% 61% 72% 
    
1. Annualized volatility is estimated by multiplying the standard deviation of % 
daily changes by sqrt(250) 
2. Refers to the 30 days constant maturity VIX Futures Index that we constructed 
3. 'All Data' corresponds to the period December 4, 2007 - November 30, 2009 
 
For all three volatility measures, the average values for the different periods were 
comparable. The average values for the Crisis period were 49%, 37% and 42% higher than the 
Pre-Crisis period averages for the VIX, VIX Futures and VXV respectively. These results make 
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sense intuitively: VIX Futures are mean reverting and thus don’t change as much as the VIX 
Index. Additionally, since VXV measures 90 day expected market volatility and incorporates the 
expectations of the 30 day market volatility (VIX), it is expected to be more stable than the VIX 
Index. Further, the average values for the Post-Crisis period were 24%, 18% and 32% higher 
than the Pre-Crisis period averages for the VIX, VIX Futures and VXV respectively. These 
results show that even as the stock market rebounded from its March 2009 bottom, the average 
values for three volatility measures were still significantly higher than their Pre-Crisis averages. 
Results from Table 4b provide evidence that these three measures of volatility were more 
volatile during the Crisis period compared to other periods. The annualized volatility values for 
the VIX, VIX Futures and VXV for the Crisis period were 34%, 50% and 33% higher than the 
Pre-Crisis period volatilities. For the Post-Crisis period, the volatilities of VIX, VIX Futures and 
VXV were 87%, 101% and 77% respectively of their Pre-Crisis period values.  
The behavior of the volatility of VIX Futures was different from that of the volatility of 
VIX and VXV Indexes. During the Crisis, volatility of VIX Futures increased more than that of 
the other measures, whereas during the Post-Crisis period, the volatility of VIX Futures reverted 
to its Pre-Crisis level while VIX and VXV became more stable compared to Pre-Crisis. The 
reason for this behavior could be related to VIX Future’s Pre-Crisis value. During the Pre-Crisis 
period, VIX Futures had the lowest volatility of all three measures: the volatility of VIX and 
VXV Indexes were 2.0 and 1.36 times that of the 30 days constant maturity VIX Futures.  
Volatility of Volatility: Implied Volatility of VIX Options 
Figure 6 shows a plot of the average monthly implied volatilities that were estimated 
using the At-The-Money VIX Call Options. Not surprisingly, the implied volatility of VIX 
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Options was highest in October 2008, the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
The spike in implied volatility in August 2007 could be related a specific action – the French 
bank BNP Paribas decided to freeze redemptions from its structured products funds due to 
liquidity concerns, which resulted in a panic in the market. 
 
Figure 6: Average implied volatility of At-The-Money VIX Call Options. The August 2007 
spike in implied volatility correspond to the problems with the BNP Paribas structured funds and 
the Oct 2008 peak corresponds to the market panic following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 
September 2008. The sample period is February 2006 – November 2009. Source: CBOE 
MarketData Express Service 
 
Table 5: Comparison of different measures of Volatility of Volatility 
     
Period 
VIX Options - Average 
Implied Volatility1 
Volatility of VIX 
% Daily Changes 
Volatility of VIX Futures 
% Daily Changes2  
Pre-Crisis3 80% 119% 56%  
Crisis 96% 128% 71%  
Post-Crisis 69% 83% 48%  
All Data4 83% 116% 59%  
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1. At-The-Money Call Options were used to estimate implied volatility using the Black model 
2. Refers to the 30 days constant maturity VIX Futures Index that we constructed 
3. Pre-Crisis volatility estimates for VIX and VIX Futures are different from that reported in 
Table 4b due to the different sample periods. 
4. All-Data corresponds to the period February 24, 2006 - November 30, 2009 
 
Data in Table 5 shows that the implied volatility of VIX options increased during the 
Crisis period. Further, as the market rebounded from its March 2009 lows, the implied volatility 
of VIX Options dropped to levels lower than were observed before the Crisis. From Figure 6, it 
is easy to see that, except for a few spikes, the average monthly implied volatilities were quite 
similar.  
Results in Table 5 also show that the implied volatility of VIX Options is lower than the 
realized volatility of VIX for all periods. This difference is to be expected because the underlying 
for the VIP Options is VIX Forwards, which are less volatile than VIX due to mean reversion.  
 
IV.2. Term Structure of Volatility: VIX vs VXV 
Tables 4a and 4b showed the average values of the VIX and VXV Indexes and their 
annualized volatilities. Table 6 provides the correlation between these indexes and the statistical 
summary of the VIX:VXV ratio.  
Table 6: Summary Statistics for the VIX:VXV Ratio 
     
Period 
Correlation 
between VIX 
and VXV 
Average 
VIX:VXV Ratio 
Standard 
Deviation of 
VIX:VXV Ratio 
% Time 
VIX:VXV 
Ratio > 11 
Pre-Crisis 0.961 0.993 0.053 44% 
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Crisis 0.967 1.021 0.111 46% 
Post-Crisis 0.984 0.928 0.043 2% 
All Data2 0.969 0.983 0.095 30% 
     
1. % Time is estimated as the % of days the ratio of closing values of VIX and VXV was 
greater than 1 
2. 'All Data' refers to the time period December 4, 2007 - November 30, 2009 
 
The above results provide some interesting observations. First, there is very strong 
correlation between these two indexes, as expected. Second, for 70% of the study period, the 
VXV Index was higher than the VIX Index, indicating that the market expected the medium term 
stock market volatility to be higher than the short term volatility. This effect is very pronounced 
for the Post-Crisis period where the VXV Index was higher than the VIX Index for almost 98% 
of the time and the average VIX:VXV ratio was the smallest. The behavior of the VIX:VXV 
ratio during the Crisis period was different from other periods – during the Crisis period, on 
average, the VIX Index was higher than the VXV Index, indicating more near-term uncertainty. 
Moreover, the VIX:VXV ratio during the Crisis period was twice as volatile as this ratio in other 
periods, as seen by the standard deviation of this ratio. Appendix B shows the results of T-tests 
which indicate that the average VIX:VXV ratio during the crisis is different from 1 and different 
from the ratios for the other periods at 95% significance levels.  
 
IV.3. Volatility Skew 
Figure 7 and Table 7 provide a summary of the regression of 30 days Implied Volatility 
Skew of the S&P 500 Options on the 30 days Implied Volatility of the At-The-Money S&P 500 
Options. The results indicate that there is a strong correlation between the Volatility Skew 
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and the ATM Implied Volatility during the Crisis period, whereas during other periods, the 
correlation is very weak. For the Post-Crisis period, the small t-statistic for the regression 
indicates that the linear relationship between Volatility Skew and ATM Volatility cannot be 
established at high significance levels. We posit that the reason for the weak correlation during 
the Post-Crisis period could be due to the low variance of both the Volatility Skew and the ATM 
Volatility during this period. The standard deviation as a percentage of the average was the 
lowest for both ATM Volatility (19.4%) and the Volatility Skew (15.2%) during the Post-Crisis 
period. As a result, the observed data may not have had sufficient variability to establish a linear 
relationship with a high level of significance. This suggested to us that the volatility skew might 
be level dependent but insensitive for small changes in ATM Volatility. So, we divided the data 
into groups based on bands of ATM Volatility and performed a regression between the Average 
ATM Volatility and Average Volatility skew. Table 8 shows the ATM Volatility and Volatility 
Skew data by bands and Table 9 shows the summary of the regression analysis using the bands. 
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 Figure 7: Regression of Implied Volatility Skew of 30 days S&P 500 Options on the At-The-
Money Implied Volatility of 30 days S&P 500 Options. The regression results are significant and 
indicate that a strong correlation volatility skew and the level of volatility. The sample period for 
this study is January 2005 – November 2009. Data Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Summary of Regression of S&P 500 Implied Volatility Skew on ATM Implied Volatility 
        
Period Correlation 
 Average 
ATM IV1 
Std Dev 
ATM 
IV1 
Average 
Vol Skew2
Std Dev 
Vol 
Skew2 
Coefficient of 
ATM 
Volatility 
 t-
Statistic 
Pre-Crisis 0.406 13.4 4.7 4.6 1.05 0.089 12.58 
Crisis 0.853 33.1 14.1 9.4 4.43 0.268 26.46 
Post-Crisis 0.019 25.3 4.9 9.3 1.42 0.005 0.232 
All Data3 0.849 19.1 11.4 6.2 3.23 0.240 56.05 
        
1. ‘ATM IV’ refers to the At-The-Money Implied Volatility (100% money) of 30 days S&P 500 Options 
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2. ‘Vol Skew’ refers to the implied volatility skew of 30 days S&P 500 Options (90% money Implied 
Volatility - 110% money Implied Volatility) 
3. 'All Data' refers to the time period January 2005 - November 2009 
 
Table 8: Summary of data grouped by ATM Implied Volatility Bands 
   
Group 
30 Days 100% Money 
Implied Volatility 
30 Days Implied Volatility 
Skew 
5-10 9.50 3.93 
10-15 11.60 4.52 
15-20 17.64 5.43 
20-25 22.29 6.70 
25-30 26.82 7.70 
30-35 32.80 10.36 
35-40 37.82 11.70 
40-45 41.49 13.01 
45-50 47.72 13.56 
50-55 52.02 14.35 
55-60 57.35 14.83 
60-65 62.37 14.32 
65-70 68.93 16.40 
70-75 73.11 13.12 
 
 
Table 9: Summary of Regression of S&P 500 Volatility Skew on 30 days ATM Volatility 
      
 Coefficient t-Statistic 
Regression R-
square Regression F  
Intercept 3.157 3.35  
30 Days 100% Money 0.188 8.96 
0.87 80.3 
 
      
1. The sample period for this study is January 2005 - October 2009   
2. The regression equation is: Volatility Skew = 3.157 + 0.188 * ATM Volatility  
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The large t-statistic for the regression indicates with a high level of significance that there 
is linear relationship between the Volatility Skew and the ATM Volatility. Moreover, an R-
square of 0.87 indicates that the ATM Volatility explains 87% of the variability in the Volatility 
Skew. These results and the regression results for the Post-Crisis period shown in Table 7 (where 
the correlation was weak due to low variance of the independent and dependent variables) 
support our hypothesis that the Volatility Skew is dependent on the level of ATM Volatility but 
is insensitive to small changes in ATM Volatility. 
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IV.4. Leverage Effect:  Relationship between S&P 500 returns, VIX and VIX Futures 
Table 10 below shows the results of our analysis. Appendix C shows the complete results 
of the regression analysis for each period that we analyzed. 
Table 10: Regression Results – Relationship between  daily SPX returns (dependent variable) and 
daily changes in VIX (independent variable) 
      
Period 
VIX Increases 
100 bps3 
VIX Decreases 
100 bps3 R-Square Regression F Intercept 
Pre-Crisis -0.745% 0.539% 0.71 961 0.115% 
Crisis -1.468% 0.557% 0.76 423 0.265% 
Post-Crisis -0.645% 0.700% 0.56 111 0.073% 
All Data1 -0.861% 0.593% 0.72 1588 0.118% 
Whaley2 -0.707% 0.469% 0.56   
      
1. 'All Data' corresponds to the time period January 2005 - November 2009 
2. In 2000, Robert Whaley estimated the relationship between weekly changes in VIX values and impact 
on   S&P 500 based on data from 1986 - 1999 
3. The data in these columns represents the changes in S&P 500 associated with a 100 bps increase or 
decrease in VIX 
 
During the Pre-Crisis and All-Data scenarios, the relationship between the SPX Index 
returns and changes in VIX is comparable to the results reported by Whaley. During the Crisis 
period, however, the relationship between S&P 500 returns and VIX change is different from 
that in other periods. During the crisis, a -1.468% return of S&P 500 index value is associated 
with a 100 bps increase in VIX, whereas during the other periods, S&P 500 index returns of -
0.65% to -0.86% were associated with a 100 bps increase in VIX. Although we regressed S&P 
500 returns on VIX Change, we do not imply that the change in VIX values causes the S&P 500 
to decrease or increase. The mechanics of the interaction could be described as follows: if an 
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exogenous negative shock impacts the system, it would cause a drop in the value of the S&P 500 
index. This could cause an instantaneous increase in the volatility, which increases the value of 
the VIX.  
The results show that the VIX index was less sensitive to drops in the value of S&P 500 
during the crisis period compared to other periods. It is possible that during the crisis, the implied 
volatility on the S&P options was very high and thus bigger changes in S&P 500 were required 
during this period, compared to other periods, to cause the same change in implied volatility. The 
implied volatility data for the At-The-Money (ATM) SPX options that we obtained from 
Bloomberg confirms this hypothesis – the average ATM implied volatility during the crisis 
period was 33.1 compared to 19.1 for the entire study period. Additionally, during the Post-Crisis 
period, the impact on S&P 500 was higher when VIX dropped than when VIX increased. Again, 
without implying causality, what this means is that VIX dropped less for a certain increase in the 
S&P 500 value during this period compared to other periods. This could be because investors 
were very risk-averse after experiencing the turbulent markets during the crisis period and thus 
were slow to change their expectations about future volatility despite the improvements in 
S&P500. 
Table 11: Correlation of SPX Returns with VIX and 30-day maturity VIX Futures 
Period 
SPX Returns 
Correlation with VIX 
SPX Returns Correlation with 
30-day maturity VIX Futures 
Pre-Crisis -0.84 -0.80 
Crisis -0.87 -0.85 
Post-Crisis -0.75 -0.82 
All-Data1 -0.85 -0.84 
1. All-Data corresponds to the period January 2006 - November 2009 
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Table 11 shows that the 30 day maturity VIX Futures contract has a strong negative 
correlation with SPX returns. Moreover, the results show that the correlation of the VIX Futures 
contract with SPX returns is quite comparable to the correlation between SPX returns and VIX 
changes, indicating that VIX Futures provide a good hedge against market volatility. 
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V. SUMMARY 
The stock market volatility, as measured by the volatility of S&P 500 Index, increased 
from 13.4% during the Pre-Crisis period to 43.6% during the Crisis (325% of Pre-Crisis level). 
Even after the S&P 500 Index rebounded from its March 2009 lows, the market volatility 
reverted only to 20.9%, which is 156% of the Pre-Crisis level. Similar behavior was also 
observed in the other measures of Volatility that we analyzed, i.e., VIX, VIX Futures and VXV. 
All three measures of volatility increased significantly during the Crisis period compared to the 
Pre-Crisis values. Moreover, as the market rebounded during the Post-Crisis period, all three 
measures decreased from their Crisis period highs, but did not revert back to the pre-Crisis level, 
indicating that market participants continued to expect higher market volatility despite the rally 
in the S&P 500 Index. The behavior of observed Volatility of Volatility (VIX, VIX Futures and 
VXV) and expected volatility of volatility (Implied Volatility of VIX Call Options) was a little 
different from that of Market Volatility. The Volatility of Volatility during the Crisis period 
increased from the Pre-Crisis levels, similar to the behavior of market volatility. However, 
during the Post-Crisis period, the volatility of volatility reverted to levels lower than those 
observed during the Pre-Crisis levels for most measures that we analyzed, unlike the market 
volatility values which remained above their Pre-Crisis levels.  
We found the leverage effect during the study period. The relationship between market 
returns and volatility during the Pre-Crisis period was similar to that found by Whaley (2000). 
However, during the Crisis and Post-Crisis periods, this relationship seemed different. During 
the Crisis period, VIX seemed to be less sensitive to decreases in SPX Index, whereas during the 
Post-Crisis period, VIX seemed to be less sensitive to increases in SPX Index.  
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Appendix A – Bloomberg Implied Volatility Calculations 
I. Introduction 
Bloomberg equity implied volatility datasets consist of implied volatilities for fixed maturities 
and moneyness levels based on out of the money option prices (4 pm closing mid prices). Their 
methodology is split into 2 parts: calculation of the implied forward price and calculation of 
implied volatility surface consistent with the implied forward price. 
II. Implied Forward Price 
First, Bloomberg calculates the European Call and Put option prices from mid prices of 
American options, mid-underlying price (S), rates from Bloomberg S23 curve and dividends 
based on Bloomberg forecast model. Next, using put call parity, the implied forward price is 
calculated from the European call and put prices closest to the at-the-money and the interpolated 
risk-free rate as follows: 
Fimpl = Strike + ert (cE – pE)  
Where cE and pEare the European Call and Put option prices. 
To calculate the implied forwards for fixed maturity points (30, 60 days etc), the forward prices 
are transformed into returns using the following formula: 
rimpl (T) = ( ) ln( ) 
Finally,  
Fimpl (T) = Spot * exp( rimpl*T) 
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 III. Volatility Surface 
The implied volatility σimpl for each maturity and strike level is computed by equating the Black-
Scholes formula to the European option price calculated using the methodology of section II and 
the implied forward also calculated in section II. 
cE = e-rt Fimpl N( ) – Ke-rt N( ) 
To calculate the implied volatility at a fixed level of moneyness, Bloomberg uses non-parametric 
interpolation in variance space across strikes and to interpolate in time, they use a Hermite cubic 
spline interpolation in total implied variance space. 
IV. Definition 
% Moneyness =   
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Appendix B – VIX:VXV T-test results 
Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Crisis Period, Post-Crisis Period  
 
Two-sample T for Crisis Period vs Post-Crisis Period 
 
                      N    Mean   StDev   SE Mean 
Crisis           263   1.021   0.111     0.0069 
Post-Crisis  191   0.9278  0.0434   0.0031 
 
 
Difference = mu (Crisis) - mu (Post-Crisis) 
Estimate for difference:  0.09280 
95% CI for difference:  (0.07796, 0.10765) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 12.29   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 361 
 
Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Crisis Period, Pre-Crisis Period 
 
Two-sample T for Crisis Period vs Pre-Crisis Period 
 
                   N     Mean   StDev   SE Mean 
Crisis         263   1.021   0.111     0.0069 
Pre-Crisis   70    0.9929  0.0526   0.0063 
 
 
Difference = mu (Crisis) - mu (Pre-Crisis) 
Estimate for difference:  0.02777 
95% CI for difference:  (0.00944, 0.04610) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = 2.98   
P-Value = 0.003  DF = 241 
 
 
One-Sample T: Crisis Period  
 
Test of mu = 1 vs not = 1 
 
 
Variable    N     Mean    StDev      SE Mean         95% CI                T       P 
Crisis       263  1.02064  0.11133  0.00686     (1.00713, 1.03416)  3.01  0.003 
 
 
117
 
 
 118
 
 
Appendix C – Leverage Effect: Regression Analysis Results 
Regression Results - Pre 
Crisis        
Multiple R 0.8428        
R Square 0.7104        
Adj R Square 0.7096        
Standard Error 0.0046        
Observations 787        
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 2 0.0401 0.0200 961.4 1.11E-211    
Residual 784 0.0163 0.0000      
Total 786 0.0564          
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.001 0.000 4.538 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
ΔVIX -0.005 0.000 -30.125 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
ΔVIX + -0.002 0.000 -4.802 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 
 
Regression Results - Crisis       
Multiple R 0.875        
R Square 0.765        
Adj R Square 0.763        
Standard Error 0.013        
Observations 263        
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 2 0.153 0.076 423.1 0.000    
Residual 260 0.047 0.000      
Total 262 0.200          
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.003 0.001 2.073 0.039 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 
ΔVIX -0.006 0.000 -19.77 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
ΔVIX + -0.009 0.002 -4.278 0.000 -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 
 
Note: ΔVIX + = ΔVIX if ΔVIX > 0; otherwise ΔVIX + = 0 
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Regression Results - Post Crisis 
Multiple R 0.747        
R Square 0.559        
Adj R Square 0.554        
Standard Error 0.009        
Observations 178        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 2 0.017 0.009 110.8 0.000    
Residual 175 0.014 0.000      
Total 177 0.031          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.001 0.001 0.659 0.511 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
ΔVIX -0.007 0.001 -9.96 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 
ΔVIX + 0.001 0.002 0.266 0.790 -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.005 
 
Regression Results - All Data 
         
Multiple R 0.8495        
R Square 0.7217        
Adj R Square 0.7212        
Standard Error 0.0081        
Observations 1228        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 2 0.2082 0.1041 1588 0    
Residual 1225 0.0803 0.0001      
Total 1227 0.2884          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
P-
value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 0.0012 0.0003 3.45 0.0006 0.0005 0.0019 0.0005 0.002 
ΔVIX -0.0059 0.0001 -43.79 0.0000 -0.0062 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
ΔVIX + -0.0027 0.0006 -4.79 0.0000 -0.0038 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
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Note: ΔVIX + = ΔVIX if ΔVIX > 0; otherwise ΔVIX + = 0 
